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Abstract (English) 
 
The African Union is currently operationalizing the Continental Early Warning System 
(CEWS) with the ultimate objective of anticipating and preventing violent conflicts in a timely 
manner using robust early warning information capable of initiating timely preventive action. 
A key part of the process of operationalizing the CEWS is synchronizing conflict early 
warning practice in the continent. Reflecting on this process, this thesis explores Africa 
Union’s efforts to harmonize the various conflict early warning mechanisms in Africa. Using 
multiple case studies showcasing conflict early warning practice both at sub-regional and 
continental levels, the study empirically reconstructs the historical development of conflict 
early warning in Africa; explores its application in the case of African conflicts; and 
subsequently indicates the areas, modalities and challenges of harmonization.  
 
Abstract (Deutsch) 
Die Afrikanische Union operationalisiert derzeit das Kontinentale Konfliktfrühwarnsystem 
(CEWS) mit dem Ziel, gewalttätige Konflikte durch gesicherte Frühwarnungen rechtzeitig 
vorherzusagen und zu verhindern und dadurch rechtzeitig Präventivmaßnahmen ergreifen zu 
können. Eine Schlüsselrolle in diesem Operationalisierungsprozess der CEWS spielt die 
kontinentweite Harmonisierung der Frühwarnungspraxis. Um diesen Prozess zu reflektieren, 
untersucht die vorliegende Arbeit die Bemühungen der Afrikanischen Union, die 
verschiedenen Frühwarnmechanismen in Afrika zu harmonisieren. Anhand mehrerer 
Fallstudien, die für die Frühwarnmethoden bei Konflikten auf subregionalem und 
kontinentalem Niveau exemplarisch sind, versucht die Studie die historische Entwicklung der 
Frühwarnsysteme bei Konflikten in Afrika empirisch zu rekonstruieren und untersucht 
Anwendungen bei afrikanischen Konflikten; schließlich verweist sie auf die 
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Anwendungsgebiete, die Modalitäten und die Herausforderungen der Harmonisierung hin. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Background Information 
 
The idea of preventing wars is not new to Africa. Nonetheless, attempt to prevent conflicts 
through the use of early warning is inarguably a very recent phenomenon. Being an important 
component of conflict prevention, conflict early warning is basically conceived1 as a means of 
“avoiding or minimizing violence, deprivation or humanitarian crises that threaten the 
sustainability of human development and livelihood.”2 
 
The application of early warning in the realm of conflict prevention in the continent was 
started in the 1990s in line with a global trend in conflict management and resolution which 
espoused a preventive approach towards violent conflicts.3 Africa‘s very first attempt at 
establishing a conflict early warning unit was initiated in June 1992, “when the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) decided to establish the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution.”4 Whereas the OAU did not manage to establish a fully-
operational early warning system for a number of reasons to be explained at a later stage of 
this research, it has acquired due credit at least for starting the process of implementing 
conflict early warning at a continental level which was later pursued by its successor, the 
                                                 
1 In fact, there are several definitions and objectives of a conflict early warning system which will be dealt in 
greater depth in the second chapter of this study. 
2 John Davies, “Conflict Early Warning and Early Response for Sub-Saharan Africa: Crisis and Transition Tool 
Kit”, Summary of Working Draft Submitted to Center for International Development and Conflict Management 
(CIDCM), University of Maryland, Maryland, 2000, 2. 
3 The 1990s are crucial datelines in the discussion of conflict early warning systems both globally and in Africa. 
Globally, since the late 1990s, early warning and conflict prevention have become high-priority areas for 
multilateral organizations and, at the highest levels, there is growing political will for more effective institutional 
approaches. Sharath Srinivasan, “Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Lessons from 
Darfur”, Minority Rights Group International Micro Paper, 2006. Available on, 
http://www.minorityrights.org/965/micro-studies/minority-rights-early-warning-and-conflict-prevention-
lessons-from-darfur.html, (accessed July 30, 2009). 
4 Jackie Cillers, “Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa: What Role for the Civil Society?”, in 
Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (eds.), Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and 
Post Reconstruction (Oxford: James Curry Publishers 2008), 39. 
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African Union.5 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Pictorial Representation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)6 
 
Currently, the African Union (AU) is undertaking the process of operationalizing a continental 
wide early warning system as part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
which is designed to address the continent’s peace and security needs.7 Within the APSA 
shown in Figure1.1, the Continental Early Warning System (hereafter referred to as CEWS) 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 João Gomes Porto, “The African Union Continental Early Warning System: Methodological Design, 
Implementation and Operationalization”, Presentation for Postdam Spring Dialogues 2009: The Key to Success 
in Peace and Development? Regional Governance in Africa. 27-28 March 2009, Postdam. 
7 According to the Peace and Security Council Protocol of the African Union that came into force following the 
transformation of the OAU into the AU, the new African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) will be 
composed of the Peace and Security Council (PSC); the Panel of the Wise; the Continental Early Warning System 
(CEWS); the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund. Ulf Engle and João Gomes Porto, “The African 
Union’s New Peace and Security Architecture: Towards an Evolving Security Regime?”, African Security Reviews 
(Forthcoming), 2009. 
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plays a crucial role in facilitating “the anticipation and prevention of violent conflicts”8  by 
gathering and analyzing information that enable decision-makers in the African Union to 
prevent violent conflicts in a timely manner.9 
 
An important feature of the CEWS is its relation vis-à-vis other conflict early warning 
mechanisms which exist at sub-regional levels in Africa. In addition to the Situation Room 
which facilitates the collection and analysis of data at the Union‘s Headquarter in Addis 
Ababa, these sub-regional mechanisms10 are to form integral parts of the CEWS and are 
envisaged to serve as the main source of early warning data.11 Reflecting the centrality of the 
sub-regional mechanisms, the AU stipulates that the harmonization between the African 
Union and RECs (Regional Economic Communities) is essential for the effective functioning 
of the CEWS.12 As a result, the AU has made harmonizing the various early warning 
mechanisms within the CEWS framework one of the major tasks of the implementation of 
the continent’s peace and security architecture. According to the Conflict Management 
Division of the AU, the CEWS13 which is tasked with the role of harmonizing conflict early 
warning in the continent, serves as “an overarching framework in which the purpose, method 
and terminology of early warning will be a shared one”14 among the various early warning 
mechanisms in the continent.  
 
 
                                                 
8 African Union (AU), The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
(Durban: African Union, 2002), Article 12(1). 
9 Ibid. 
10 The terms sub-regional early warning mechanisms and sub-regional early warning systems will be used 
interchangeably in this study. 
11 African Union, The Peace and Security Protocol, Article 12(1). 
12 AU [African Union] CMD [Conflict Management Division] (Eds.), “Framework for Operationalization of the 
Continental Early Warning System”, in Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the 
Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a), 51. 
13 African Union [African Union] CMD [Conflict Management Division] (eds.), The CEWS Handbook, (Addis 
Ababa: African Union, 2008b), 11. 
14 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 9. 
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1.2 Statement of the Problem  
 
The success of the APSA as Africa’s security regime depends on the effective collaboration 
between the AU and other Regional Economic Communities (RECs)15 which undertake 
various activities with regard to the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in the 
continent.16 As hinted earlier, the CEWS, which is a constituent part of the APSA, similarly 
relies on its effective partnership with other conflict early warning systems or mechanisms 
currently in operation in the various sub-regional organizations or RECs (See Figure 1.2 for 
the distribution of early warning systems in Africa). Nonetheless, the various early warning 
mechanisms in the RECs are currently at different levels of institutional development and they 
employ different early warning methodologies to monitor a wide range of conflicts in their 
respective sub-regions.17 Notwithstanding, based on its “harmonizing and coordination 
roles”18, the AU seeks to create an effective harmonized partnership among the early warning 
mechanisms of the different sub-regions as part of the CEWS framework in the face of 
different approaches to the practice of early warning and disparity in institutional set-up and 
development. How this is to be achieved is worth an investigation. 
 
                                                 
15 Sub-regional organizations or Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are intergovernmental organizations 
or regional groupings in Africa established with the objective of facilitating cooperation and economic integration 
among their member states. RECs also serve as the building blocks for the step by step formation of the African 
Economic Community. In addition to their involvement in the economic sphere, the RECs also participate in 
political cooperation including the enforcement of peace and security in their respective sub-regions. The most 
notable RECs in the continent are the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD), Sothern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). African 
Union, “Declaration”, First Conference of Africa Ministers of Integration (COMAI), 30-31 March 2006, 
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Available on, http://www.africa-
union.org/Economic%20Affairs/RECS%20Rationalization/AU%20site5/Reports/Ouagadougou%20DECLAR
ATION%2031%20March%202006.doc, (accessed on 31 August, 2009).  
16 Engle and Gomes Porto, “The African Union’s”, (without page numbers). 
17 Emmanuel Fanta, “The Capacity of African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security”, Paper presented to 
the European Report on Development Workshop: Transforming Political Structures: Security, Institutions, and 
Regional Integration Mechanisms, Florence, April 16-17, 2009. Available on, http://erd.eui.eu/media/fanta.pdf, 
(accessed July 31, 2009). 
18 Engle and Gomes Porto, “The African Union’s”, (without page numbers). 
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Figure 1.2. Early Warning Systems in the African Region19 
 
 
1.3 Research Objective and Questions 
Research in the field of conflict early warning is increasingly growing enriched by the 
contribution of academic and research institutions, NGOs, and international organizations 
such as the UN, OSCE, OECD, etc. The field has undergone extensive scrutiny especially in 
terms of methodologies needed to carry out conflict early warning, linkages with response 
strategies and issues surrounding its efficacy. Most notable in this regard are the works of 
Alexander Austin, John L. Davies, Ted Robert Gurr, Anna Matveeva, Heinz Krummenacher, 
Susanne Schmeidl and Suzanne Verstegen.20 Some of the studies in the field also dealt with 
                                                 
19 Source: David Nyheim, Preventing Violence, War and State Collapse: The Future of Conflict Early Warning and Response 
(Paris: OECD/DAC, 2009), 53. 
20 Alexander Austin, “Early Warning and the Field. A Cargo Cult Science?”, In Berghof Research Centre for 
Constructive Conflict Management (ed..), Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation ( Berlin: Berghof Research 
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exploring specific methods and tools for monitoring conflicts in Africa.21 
 
On the contrary, due to the novelty of the very process, the level of scientific research on the 
ongoing operationalization of the CEWS is at its nascent stage. Likewise, studies on the nature 
and methods of cooperation between the various early warning mechanisms in the African 
context are almost non-existent implying the presence of a research gap that can be addressed 
with scientific enquiry aimed at conceptualizing and investigating the ongoing process of 
harmonization of conflict early warning in Africa.  
 
Consequently, largely inspired by the need to feel the research gap indicated above, this study 
seeks to pioneer a research on the evolving process of operationalizing the CEWS by 
analyzing the hitherto unexplored efforts to harmonize the various conflict early warning 
systems in Africa. In more specific terms, the study seeks to provide an empirical 
reconstruction of the process of harmonization of conflict early warning and examine the legal 
provisions, areas, modalities, and challenges of harmonization. 
 
In order to achieve the research objectives outlined above, this study poses the following 
                                                                                                                                                    
Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 2004); John L. Davies and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), Preventive 
Measures: Building Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 
Inc., 1998); Anna Matveeva, “Early Warning and Early Response: Conceptual and Empirical Dilemmas”, GPAC 
Issue Paper 1 (The Hague: European Center for Conflict Prevention/International Secretariat of the Global 
Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict, 2006); Heinz Krummenacher and Susanne Schmeidl, 
“Practical Challenges in Predicting Violent Conflicts FAST: An Example of a Comprehensive Early-Warning 
Methodology”, Swiss Peace Foundation Working Paper No. 34, 2001. Available on, 
http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Working_Paper/working_paper_34.pdf, 
(accessed July 21, 2008); Suzanne Verstegen, “Conflict Prognostication: Toward a Tentative Framework for 
Conflict Assessment”, Clingendael Institute, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Occasional Paper, 
1999. Available on, http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/1999/19990900_cru_paper_verstegen.pdf, 
(accessed on July 20, 2009). 
21 See for instance: John Davies, “Conflict Early Warning and Early Response for Sub-Saharan Africa: Crisis and 
Transition Tool Kit”, Summary of Working Draft Submitted to Center for International Development and 
Conflict Management (CIDCM), University of Maryland, Maryland, 2000; Niels von Keyserlingk and Simone 
Kopfmüller, “Conflict Early Warning Systems: Lessons Learned from Establishing a Conflict Early Warning and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN) in the Horn of Africa”, GTZ Working Paper, 2006. Available on, 
www.gtz.de/de/de/dokumente/en-igad-conflict-Early -Warning-Systems-Lesson-Learned.pdf, (accessed July 20, 
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research questions: 
1. What are the major differences and similarities among the existing conflict early warning 
mechanisms in Africa?   
2. What measures are being undertaken by the African Union to harmonize conflict early 
warning in Africa? 
3. What are the areas for harmonization? And what are the main challenges and constraints? 
 
1.4 Conceptual Clarification of Harmonization  
 
The word harmonization is traditionally used in music “to describe the structure of music with 
respect to the composition and progression of chords.”22 It refers to “bringing or coming into 
agreement.”23 It is also alternatively defined as “the act or state of agreeing or conforming.”24 
In its application in international economics, finance and law, harmonization is associated with 
both specific and comprehensive conceptions. In the more specific or narrow sense of the 
term, harmonization is conceived as a process that creates uniformity by “making the 
regulatory requirements or government policies of different jurisdictions identical”25 largely 
“through the elimination of national differences.”26 On the contrary, according to its 
comprehensive conception, harmonization as a process does not result in the creation of 
uniformity but results in the elimination of incompatibilities among different legislations.27 
                                                                                                                                                    
2009).  
22 African Union, “Harmonization of Higher Education Programmes in Africa: Opportunities and Challenges”, 
Paper Prepared for the Third Ordinary Session of the Conference of Ministers of Education of the African 
Union (COMEDAF III), 6th to 10th August 2007, Johannesburg, South Africa. Available on, http://www.africa-
union.org/root/ua/Conferences/2007/aout/HRST/06-10%20aout/Doc/AU-EXP-EDUC-2-III-Harmoni-
Oppor-Challe.part%20one1.doc, (accessed on 25 August, 2009), 13-11. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 David W. Leebron, “Lying Down with Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmonization Claims”, In Jagdish 
Bhagwati and Robert Hudec (eds.), Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts.: MIT Press, 1996), 43. 
26 Alan O. Sykes, “The (Limited) Role of Regulatory Harmonization in International Goods and Services 
Markets”, Journal of International Economic Law 2, no. 1 (1999): 50. 
27 Neil Butcher, Sarah Hoosen and Beatrice Khamati Njenga. “Harmonization of Higher Education Programmes: 
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Informed by the above two conceptions, this study explores the ongoing harmonization of 
conflict early warning systems to assess if the process creates absolute uniformity in terms of 
methodology, purpose and institutional set up among the existing early warning systems or if 
it results in selective compatibility in some of the areas mentioned earlier.  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
This research is a qualitative and an exploratory one which utilizes case study as the main 
research strategy. As an exploratory study, this research does not start with a hypothesis or an 
assumption to prove. Rather it seeks to explore, investigate and elucidate the process of 
harmonization of conflict early warning in Africa and generates hypotheses at the end based 
on the analysis of the data obtained through the various data collection techniques. 
 
1.5.1 Selection of Case Study as a Research Methodology 
 
The selection of a case study as a principal research methodology in this study is largely 
inspired by the works of Catherine Marshal, Gretchen B. Rossman and Robert K. Yin. 
Whereas Marshal and Rossman recommended case study “to investigate little-understood 
phenomena and generate hypotheses for further research,”28 Yin suggested its use for “an 
empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context.”29 
Drawing upon the above conceptions, this study investigates “harmonization of conflict early 
warning” both as a contemporary and little-understood process within its “real-life context”30 
                                                                                                                                                    
A Strategy for the African Union.” African Integration Review 3, no. 1(2009): 3. 
28 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (London: Sage Publication, 1991, 
9th Edition), 14. 
29 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (London: Sage Publications, 1994), 1. 
30 Ibid. 
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by employing three of the existing conflict early warning systems in the continent31 as case 
studies. Specifically, the evolving nature of the harmonization process which is considered as 
“work in progress”32 and the unavailability of theories which might help in explaining the 
harmonization process33 validated the use of case studies in this research.  
 
More particularly, a specific form of case study, an “embedded case study”, will be used in 
analyzing the research questions indicated earlier. Robert Yin defined embedded case study as 
a form of case study “in which there are several sub-units that are to be analyzed within the 
case.”34 In the case of this research, embedded case study is selected to allow the simultaneous 
analysis of three of the conflict early warning mechanisms which exist at different levels of 
analysis, i.e. CEWS at the continental level, the CEWARN and ECOWARN at sub-regional 
levels. It also helps to assess the impacts of the differences in terms of early warning objective, 
methodology and institutional set up on the harmonization process. Whereas Africa Union’s 
CEWS, as the main driver of the harmonization process, is the main unit of analysis; the 
CEWARN and ECOWARN will also form integral parts of the research project.  
 
1.5.2 Data Collection Strategies 
 
In addition to what was obtained from the literature review, the body of data essential for 
addressing the research questions is collected through elite interviews and document analysis.  
 
                                                 
31 The three early warning mechanisms to be used as case studies are the African Union‘s Continental Early 
Warning System(CEWS), IGAD‘s Conflict early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) from the Horn 
of Africa and the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) for the Western Africa. 
32 Charles Mwaura, interview by author, Addis Ababa, June 3rd, 2009. 
33 As mentioned earlier in Section 1.3 of this study, currently there is no study conducted on the process of 
harmonizing Africa´s conflict early warning systems. 
34 Yin, Case Study Research, 13. 
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The elite interviews35 were conducted during the two weeks field trip to the headquarters of 
the CEWS and CEWARN in Addis Ababa with officials and experts working in the two 
institutions. The main purpose of the interviews was to elicit information on the official or 
institutional position regarding the conception, rationale, area and modalities of harmonizing 
conflict early warning in Africa. In this regard, the elite interviews have proved to be valuable 
sources of information given the unavailability of scientific research on the specific issues 
mentioned earlier.36  
 
The participants in the five interviews were personnel in CEWS and CEWARN and they hold 
different positions ranging from senior expert to Situation Room coordinators. The interviews 
were organized in a semi-structured37 manner and were based on a pre-formulated interview 
guide38 to allow “the possibility of including questions that may come up during the 
interview.”39  
 
Whereas the interviews provided crucial information with substantial degree of relevance to 
the research, nevertheless, it was not possible to obtain a sufficiently large amount of data at 
least for the following two reasons. Owing largely to the “newness” of the process of 
operationalizing a harmonized continental-wide early warning framework, first of all, it was 
very difficult to find interviewees adequately conversant with the topic. Secondly, getting in 
                                                 
35 An elite interview is a specialized treatment of interviewing that focuses on a particular type of respondent. 
Elites are considered to be influential or prominent, and well-informed people in an organization or community. 
Elites are selected for interviews on the basis of their expertise in areas relevant to the research. Marshall and 
Gretchen, Designing Qualitative, 94. 
36 Likewise, acquiring an “outsider’s view” of the issue (of harmonization) from individuals and research 
organizations outside the three institutions used as case studies was not possible. The one exception, however, is 
the opportunity when one conflict analyst from the Institute of Security Studies in Addis Ababa provided his 
own personal opinions on the topic which are not employed in this research. 
37 As indicated by Russell Bernard, semi-structured interview is recommended when “dealing with managers, 
bureaucrats, and elite members of the community.” H. Russell Bernard, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and 
Quantitative Approaches (London: Sage Publication, 2000), 191. 
38 The set of questions used in the interview guide are to be found in Appendix one.  
39 Bernard, Social Research Methods, 191. 
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touch with those who were actively involved in the process was also challenging given their 
busy work schedules.40  
 
Besides the elite interviews, document analysis41 was used as another data collection strategy in 
this study. The researcher employed document analysis to compliment evidence obtained 
from the elite interviews with the overall purpose of creating an empirical database which 
helps in identifying the different approaches to conflict early warning in the various sub-
regional mechanisms. The analysis primarily included a survey of official documents that were 
instrumental in the establishment and operationalization of the various conflict early warning 
mechanisms in the case studies. The most notable limitation of document analysis as a data 
collection strategy in this study was the problem of getting access to some of the most 
relevant official documents in the institutions featured as case studies. 
 
1.6. Structure of the Study 
In terms of structure, this study is organized in the following manner. This chapter has 
provided the contextual background of the research, outlined its major objectives, introduced 
the main research questions and briefly highlighted the research methodology. Chapter two 
provides an overview of conceptual issues related with conflict early warning including its 
definitions, objectives, historical development, and classifications. Chapter three presents a 
concise survey of the historical root causes of African conflicts and highlights the application 
of conflict early warning in the anticipation and prevention of these conflicts. In chapter four, 
a brief presentation of the history of conflict early warning in Africa will be provided. 
                                                 
40 The author had to wait, for example, for about two weeks to meet with Mr. Charles Mwaura, AU’s Expert on 
Conflict Early Warning System & Preventive Diplomacy, who was extremely busy with official travels and 
meetings.  
41 According to Catherine Marshall and G. B. Rossman, the importance of document analysis lies in its utility in 
making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages and in 
corroborating and augmenting evidence from other sources. Marshall and Rossman, Designing Qualitative, 98. 
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Furthermore, this chapter will briefly highlight current conflict early warning practices both at 
the continental and sub-regional levels. Chapter five provides a comparative analysis of the 
CEWARN and ECOWARN with the purpose of showing the different approaches to early 
warning practice in the continent. Subsequently, chapter six explores the areas, modalities, and 
challenges of harmonization of conflict early warning. Finally, this study winds up by 
providing its conclusions in chapter seven.  
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Chapter Two: Conflict Early Warning: Basic Discussion 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As indicated in chapter one, the African Union is in the process of implementing the various 
pillars of the African peace and security architecture (APSA) including the Continental Early 
Warning System (CEWS) which is envisaged to be instrumental in the timely prevention of 
violent conflicts. An integral part of this process is that of harmonizing conflict early warning 
in the continent by integrating the early warning mechanisms of the different sub-regions 
within the overarching framework of the CEWS. Intent on situating this process of 
harmonization in the proper conceptual context, this chapter attempts to provide synthesized 
information on theoretical aspects of conflict early warning. To this end, the chapter first 
surveys the different definitions and objectives of conflict early warning; explores its historical 
development; and finally concludes by providing an overview of classifications of early 
warning systems. 
 
2.2 Defining Conflict Early Warning 
There are several definitions of the generic term “conflict early warning” in the literature. 
Most of the existing definitions reflect attempts in various levels to respond to “the four 
important questions in early warning: who to warn, when, of what, and how.”42 While some of 
the definitions emphasize on the “what and who to warn” aspects of the question, others 
underscore methodological considerations of how to carry out early warning.  
 
For instance, OECD’s definition addresses the questions of “what and who to warn” by 
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defining conflict early warning as “a process that (a) alerts decision makers to the potential 
outbreak, escalation and resurgence of violent conflicts; and (b) promotes an understanding 
among decision makers of the nature and impacts of violent conflicts.”43 On the other hand, 
Alex Austin’s definition stresses methodological considerations and conceptualizes the term as 
“any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of 
recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic, 
whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both.”44 The Forum on Early Warning 
and Early Response45 or FEWER’s definition is more comprehensive in that it addresses the 
“what, who, how” elements of the conflict early warning questions by proposing the following 
definition:  
 
Conflict early warning is the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of 
crises for the purposes of (1) anticipating the escalation of violent conflicts, (2) development of 
strategic response to these crises, and (3) the presentation of options to critical actors( national, 
regional and international) for the purposes of decision-making and preventive action.46 
 
 
Conflict early warning is not a self-contained or independent undertaking in and of itself. 
Rather, it is considered as “complimentary” 47 to conflict prevention48 strategies of actors at 
various levels. In more particular sense, conflict early warning is considered as “a prerequisite 
for operational conflict prevention which seeks to contain or reverse the escalation of violent 
conflict by using the tools of preventive diplomacy, economic sanctions and/or incentives, 
                                                                                                                                                    
42 Krummenacher and Schmeidl, “Practical Challenges”, 3. 
43 Nyheim, Preventing Violence, 53. 
44 Austin, “Early Warning and the Field”, 2. 
45 FEWER (The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response) is a global coalition of non-governmental and 
governmental agencies and academic institutions working to promote coordinated responses to violent conflict. 
http://www.fewer-international.org/pages/africa/, (accessed July 1, 2009). 
46 FEWER [The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response] Secretariat, “Forum on Early Warning and 
Early Response: A New Collaborative Effort”, Refuge 16, no. 1 (1997): 24. 
47 Tobias Debiel and Herbert Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism: Tools for Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of Regional Organization? A Comparative Study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and 
PIF. Regional and Global Axes of Conflict”, Crisis States Research Center Working Paper Series No. 2 (London: 
Crisis States Research Center, 2009), 4. 
48 There are two forms of conflict prevention. While Operational conflict prevention seeks to contain or reverse 
the escalation of violent conflict , structural prevention seeks to reduce the risk of violent conflict in countries or 
regions by transforming social, economic, cultural, or political sources of conflict. Carnegie Corporation, 
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and/or military force.”49 As will be further explained later with the use of practical conflict 
scenarios in chapter three, conflict early warning is one of the various conflict prevention 
tools which can be applied at the initial or latent stages of a particular conflict.  
 
The concept of conflict early warning is also closely related to that of early response, which is 
defined as “any initiative that occurs in the latent stages of a perceived potential armed 
conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution or transformation.”50 Response can be 
undertaken by different actors such as international community, regional organizations, 
national governments, civil society organizations, etc. In fact, as indicated in OECD’s 2009 
early warning publication, existing “common wisdom” in the field dictates that conflict early 
warnings should have “a strong link to responders or response mechanisms.”51  
 
2.3 Objectives of Conflict Early Warning Systems 
 
There is little or no consensus on the objectives of conflict early warning systems. Rather 
“depending on the composition of factors such as the types of conflict (interstate, ethnic or 
pastoral), geographic coverage (regional, sub-regional, or national), institutional level 
(governmental or non-governmental) or, composition of stakeholders, there are different 
expectations on how early warning systems should perform and what they should achieve.”52  
 
Nonetheless, at the most basic level, according to Alex Austin, the objective of conflict early 
warning is conceived as “obtaining knowledge to assist in the prevention and mitigation of 
                                                                                                                                                    
“Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report”, Report for the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 
(Washington: Carnegie Corporation, 1997), xxi. 
49 Susanna Campbell and Patrick Meier, “Deciding to Prevent Violent Conflict: Early Warning and Decision-
making within the United Nations”, Paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference 49th 
Annual Convention, Chicago, February 28th, 2007(cited with Patrick Meier’s permission).  
50 Austin, “Early Warning and the Field”, 2. 
51 Nyheim, Preventing Violence, 34. 
52 Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller, “Conflict Early Warning”, 3. 
 16 
 
 
conflict.”53 On a more operational or functional level, the list of early warning objectives 
identified by FEWER include: 
        identification and assessment of the most salient conflict indicators; assessment of likely trends and 
scenarios; identification of strategies and opportunities for peace; contribution towards a balanced 
situational analysis based on the interaction of the different conflict and peace factors; and translation of 
these conclusions into response options and action strategies for local, regional and international 
actors.54 
 
On the other hand, in light of the wide spectrum of security needs it seeks to achieve, the 
objective of early warning is also conceived in relation to human security.55 As shown by 
Tobias Debiel and Herbert Wulf, most conflict early warning systems currently in operation 
claim that their objective is “tackling threats to human security such as wars, armed conflicts, 
state failure, genocide, and other gross human rights violations.”56  
 
2.4 Conflict Early Warning and Traditional Intelligence 
Though conflict early warning is born out of the need to anticipate and prevent the outbreak 
of violent conflicts, ironically its origin and historical development is to be traced to traditional 
military intelligence57 which Bradley E. Perry considered as the “parent field”58 for early 
warning. Besides this “parent-child” relationship, the similarities of their methods often cause 
confusion between the above two forms of intelligence.59 As a consequence, most of the 
                                                 
53 Alexander Austin, “Early Warning and the Field”, 1. 
54 FEWER, Conflict and Peace Analysis, 3. 
55 Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses 
human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has 
opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing 
poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the 
freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment -- these are the interrelated building 
blocks of human – and therefore national – security.” United Nations, “Secretary-General Salutes International 
Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia”, UN Press Release SG/SM/7382, May 10, 2000. Available on, 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc.html, (accessed August 17, 2009).  
56 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning”, 4. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Bradley E. Perry, “Fast and Frugal Early Warning in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role of Intelligence Analysis” 
(Master´s Thesis, Faculty of Mercyhurst College, 2008), 6. 
59 The confusion between the two may arise as both early warning and intelligence depend on similar methods 
such collecting and analyzing information, scenario building, and recommending options to decision-makers for 
action and intervention. Susanne Schmeidl, “Conflict Early Warning and Prevention: Toward a Coherent 
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conflict early warning literature included a brief attempt to show major differences between 
early warning and traditional intelligence.  
 
Based on functional considerations, Jackie Cillers, for instance, distinguished the two by 
asserting that “the purpose of early warning (as opposed to traditional intelligence) is the 
formulation of strategic options directed at taking preventive action in the common (regional 
or international) good as opposed to the national interest.”60 Likewise, Susanne Schmeidl 
underscored their differences in the context of the type of security frameworks they serve. To 
this effect, Schmeidl indicated that “early warning differs from traditional intelligence in one 
fundamental point by stressing the welfare of others (human security) rather than state 
(national) security.”61 Henri Boshoff, a military analyst in the African Security Analysis 
Program at the Pretoria (Tshwane) office of the Institute for Security Studies62, summarized 
the major differences and similarities between conflict early warning systems and traditional 
intelligences as follows in Table 2.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Terminology”, In Cirû Mwaûra and Susanne Schmeidl (eds.), Early Warning and Conflict Management in the Horn of 
Africa (Asmara, Eritrea: The Red Sea Press, 2002), 73. 
60 Jackie Cillers, “Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa”, Institute of Security Studies Paper 
102 (Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 2005), 1. 
61 Schmeidl, “Conflict Early Warning”, 73. 
62 Institute for Security Studies: http://www.issafrica.org, (accessed July 24, 2009). 
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Table 2.1. Major Differences and Similarities between Early Warning and Traditional 
Intelligence Systems63 
  
 
                   Early Warning         Traditional Intelligence Systems 
Depends on the collection and analysis of 
information, scenario-building and the 
presentation of recommendations to 
decision makers 
 
Depends also on the collection and 
analysis of information, scenario building 
and the presentation of 
recommendations to decision makers 
Focuses on human security  Focuses on state security
Seeks to serve larger objectives than those 
of the state “stricto sensu” 
Seeks to serve state interest 
Depends on transparent methods and 
sharing of information 
Rely on secrecy, situation rooms and 
encrypted communications of 
classified information 
Transparency in information and analysis Closed system
Decentralized and dependent upon other 
sources of information and analysis 
Centralized and dependent on in-house 
information and analysis 
 
 
2.5 Historical Development of Conflict Early Warning  
As opposed to traditional intelligence which has existed for several hundred years, the genesis 
of conflict early warning systems was a recent phenomenon dating back to the 1950s and is 
rooted in intelligence and military reconnaissance.64 Before reaching their current application 
in conflict prevention, conflict early warning systems have gone through three different but 
overlapping phases. 
 
                                                 
63 AU [African Union] CMD [Conflict Management Division] (eds.), “Report of the Workshop on the 
Establishment of the AU CEWS: Background paper No. 1”, In Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: 
Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System. (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a), 
106. 
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During the first phase of their evolution in the last decades of the 1950s century, early warning 
systems were mainly developed “to predict impending dangers emanating from natural 
disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and stock market crashes in the economic sphere as well 
as to predict the effects of these disasters on people.”65 In the second phase of their 
development in the 1980s, early warning systems were further expanded into humanitarian 
affairs to predict famine and refugee migration with the purpose of alerting relief agencies 
about looming humanitarian crises.66 With the exception of their application for the 
anticipation of “surprise nuclear attacks and other military incidents during the Cold War”67, 
early warning systems were not employed in preventive purposes in the context of violent 
conflicts in both the first and second phases. Subsequently in the third and final phase of their 
development, early warning systems attained their application in the maintenance of global 
and regional peace and security in the early 1990s which also witnessed a surge in their 
utilization as important intervention tools for the anticipation and prevention of violent 
conflicts. 
 
The rationale behind this surge was to be found in the advocacy for “preventive culture” that 
became the hallmark of the post-cold war international politics which reiterated the 
importance of preventive action “based on timely and accurate knowledge of the facts, 
understanding of developments and global trends, and on sound analysis.”68 More importantly, 
the UN’s Secretary General’s Agenda for Peace which called for more systematic efforts 
directed at the timely prevention of conflicts gave the initial impetus to the development and 
                                                                                                                                                    
64 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning,” 3. 
65 Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, “Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Minerva's Wisdom?”, Journal of 
Humanitarian Assistance (1997). Available on , http://www.jha.ac/articles/a022.htm, (accessed August 20, 2009). 
66 Schmeidl, “Conflict Early Warning”, 72-73. 
67 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 35. 
68 United Nations, “An Agenda for Peace Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping”, Report of the 
Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 
January 1992. A/47/277 - S/24111. New York, 17 June 1992. 
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adoption of conflict early warning systems by an increasingly large number of international 
organizations (governmental and non-governmental), academic and research institutes and 
national governments.69  
2.6. Classification of Early Warning Systems 
There are a large number of systems in the field of conflict early warning often exhibiting 
differences in terms of specific models and tools in use; location of the early warning 
apparatus, and the nature of ownership of the early warning process.70 Reflecting this 
profusion, there are also different ways of classifying early warning systems based on the 
above parameters. In order to show the wide variety of early warning systems in the field and 
also help in categorizing Africa’s existing early warning mechanisms at a latter stage of this 
study in chapter five, a brief survey of the major classifications is provided as follows. 
 
Generational classification: In this classification, based on their location and organization, 
the systems are categorized as First, Second, and Third Generation early warning systems.71 In 
the First Generation early warning systems such as the International Crisis Group, the entire 
early warning mechanism is based outside the conflict region.72 The Second Generation early 
warning systems (such as FAST) employ a mixed approach by maintaining monitoring 
mechanisms on the ground (e.g. field monitors) while conducting the analysis outside the 
conflict region.73 On the other hand, Third Generation early warning systems (such as 
CEWARN, CEWS) are located in the conflict region and integrate both early warning and 
early response activities.74 
 
                                                 
69 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 35. 
70 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning”, 4. 
71 Nyheim, Preventing Violence, 34; Matveeva, “Early Warning”, 8. 
72 Matveeva, “Early Warning”, 8. 
73 Ibid., 9.  
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Suzanne Verstegen’s methodological classification: Suzanne Verstegen identified four 
ideal forms of early warning systems namely correlational, sequential, conjunctural, and 
response models.75 Correlational approach focuses on structural indicators (independent 
variables) and tries to relate causal models from empirical research to future outbreaks of 
violence (dependent variables).76 The sequential approach is working with a sequence of 
triggers and accelerators, i.e. events, and it describes how changes in an environment bring 
about a specific event or a change in some specified variable.77 Conjunctural approach works 
with a combination of conditions and events with the basic assumption that different 
combinations of a given political and geographical entity’s circumstances lead to different 
outcomes.78 This approach is trying to identify particular configurations or conditions that 
consistently precede the outbreak of violent conflicts and that do not occur in places that do 
not experience violent conflicts.79 Finally, response models try to identify windows of 
opportunities for early and effective intervention in crisis situations.80 
 
Classification based on the origin of the systems: In this form of classification, early 
warning systems are broadly categorized “according to the sectors from which they stem”81 as 
governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental. The objective of governmental 
early warning systems is often “to identify and assess threats to national interests and/or to 
inform crisis prevention and peace-building programs.”82 Examples of governmental early 
warning systems include the Crisis Early Warning System of the German Federal Ministry for 
                                                                                                                                                    
74 Ibid. 
75 Verstegen, “Conflict Prognostication”, 4-6. 
76 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning”, 4. 
77 AU [African Union] CMD [Conflict Management Division] (Eds.), “Proposal for an Indicators Module 
towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System for the African Union, Issue Paper No. 
2”, In Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the AU CEWS (Leipzig: 
Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a), 84. 
78 AU-CMD, “Proposal for an Indicators Module”, 84. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning”, 5.   
81 Ibid. 
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Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and France‘s Système d‘Alerte Précoce 
(SAP).83 On the other hand, inter-governmental early warning systems are established by 
regional and sub-regional inter-governmental organizations such as the United Nations and 
the African Union with the purpose of bolstering “the organizations’ ability to anticipate crises 
and initiate preventive measures.”84 Notable examples of these types of systems include the 
Early Warning Unit of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs, the CEWS of the African Union, and IGAD’s CEWARN. Finally, non-governmental 
systems include those in the NGO sector, in academic institutions, and research 
organizations.85   
 
Classification based on early warning models86 in use: In this form of classification, 
Monty G. Marshall categorized early warning systems as those using conditional and causal 
models; predictive models; and general risk and capacity models.87 Conditional and causal 
models deal with empirical evidence for causal interference between independent variables (of 
structural indicators) and violent conflict/political instability.88 These types of early warning 
models do not predict the actual onset or risk of violence in specific countries; rather they 
lend support to predictive models by identifying the validity of early warning indicators.89 On 
the other hand, predictive early warning models try to forecast the outbreak of violence in a 
                                                                                                                                                    
82 Nyheim, Preventing Violence, 51. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., 52. 
85 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning”, 5.   
86 An early warning model (EWM) is an analytical forecasting tool that has been honed by systematic evidence 
and can be used to identify the likelihood of specified events or conditions occurring in the future. To be useful 
in filtering forecasting information, EWM needs to be guided by a theoretical model of the phenomena being 
forecasted (e.g. civil wars, genocide) and disciplined by exposure to systematic evidence. Craig J. Jenkins and 
Susanne Schmeidl, “The Early Warning of Humanitarian Disasters: Problems in Building an Early Warning 
System”, International Migration Review 32, no. 2 (1998): 472. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Monty G. Marshall, Monty G. “Fragility, Instability, and the Failure of States. Assessing Sources of Systemic 
Risk.” Center for Preventive Action Working Paper (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2008), 9. 
89 AU [African Union] CMD [Conflict Management Division] (eds.), “Development of Indicators for Early 
Warning Systems: Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues: Background Paper No. 3”, In Meeting the 
Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System (Leipzig: 
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time span of one to five years by focusing on selected variables of both structural and event-
based nature.90 Finally, general risk and capacity models are used ‘to rank countries from weak 
to strong, building on the general association between weakness, social problems, political 
conflict, and poor state performance.91 
 
Alexander Austin’s Methodological classification: Based on their respective 
methodological approaches, Alex Austin divided early warning systems into four categories: as 
quantitative, qualitative, a dual process of quantitative and qualitative, and finally networks.92  
 
2.7 Conclusion 
With the purpose of contextualizing the process of harmonizing conflict early warning in 
Africa in the proper theoretical framework, this chapter attempted to concisely summarize 
some of the major conceptual issues related to conflict early warning. To this end, the chapter 
provided a brief overview of the various definitions and objectives of conflict early warning; 
indicated its historical development; and showed its distinctive characters in comparison with 
traditional intelligence. In the latter part of the chapter, a brief attempt was also made to 
provide an overview of the classifications of early warning systems.  
 
In a nutshell, the attempt thus far has been a theoretical one and the potential of conflict early 
warning in anticipating and preventing African conflicts has yet to be shown. To this end, in 
the coming chapter, the study provides a brief historical overview of the causes of African 
conflicts and indicates conflict early warning’s possible roles and limitations in the context of 
the prevention of conflicts in Africa.  
                                                                                                                                                    
Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a), 140. 
90 Marshall, “Fragility, Instability”, 10. 
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Chapter Three:  Overview of Historical Root Causes of African Conflicts 
3.1 Introduction 
There is a rich body of literature93 on African conflicts which are generally considered to “have 
complex histories and exhibit multiple and multidimensional causes, courses and 
consequences.”94 Whereas it is true that “Africa’s wars are the result of a myriad of structural, 
economic, political, cultural, and historical factors”95, nonetheless, there is also an overriding 
recognition in the literature that “the root causes of current conflicts in Africa are often to be 
traced back to the colonial era when Europeans scrambled for territories with scant regard for 
ethnic boundaries.”96 As shown by Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, “there is hardly any zone of conflict 
in contemporary Africa that cannot trace its sordid violence to colonial history and even the 
late nineteenth century.”97  
 
Intent on depicting the historical root causes of conflicts in Africa and highlighting the 
possible role of conflict early warning in forecasting the outbreak of these conflicts; this 
chapter explores how European colonialism, along with its attendant historical legacies, played 
a key role “in causing, sustaining, or aggravating all types of conflicts”98 through the creation 
of artificial colonial boundaries; impacting state formation; and dividing ethnic and cultural 
communities. In order to achieve the above broad objective, the following tasks will be 
                                                                                                                                                    
91 Ibid., 11. 
92 A full description of this classification is to be found in: Austin, Early Warning and the Field, 4-10. 
93  See for example: Adebayo Adedeji, Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search for Sustainable Peace 
and Good Governance (London: Zed Books, 1999); David J. Francis, Peace and Conflict in Africa (London: Zed Books, 
2008); Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (eds.), The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs (Oxford: 
James Curry Publishers, 2008); William Z. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Oxford and 
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1989). 
94  Tiyambe Zeleza, “Introduction: The Causes and Costs of war in Africa,” In Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe 
Zeleza (eds.), The Roots of African Conflicts: The Causes and Costs (Oxford: James Curry Publishers 2008), 2. 
95 Richard Jackson, “Africa’s Wars: Overview, Causes and the Challenges of Conflict Transformation”, In Oliver 
Furley and Roy May (eds.), Ending Africa’s Wars (Ashagate: Aldershot and Burlington VT., 2006), 22. 
96  Alfred Nhema, “Introduction: The Resolution of African Conflicts,” In Alfred Nhema and Paul Tiyambe 
Zeleza (eds.), Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution and Post Reconstruction (Oxford: James 
Curry Publishers 2008), 1.  
97 Zeleza, “Introduction: The Causes and Costs of war in Africa”, 2. 
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undertaken in this chapter. Firstly, the nature of both the pre and post-colonial borders as well 
as the impact of colonial intervention on African territoriality will be briefly discussed. 
Subsequently, the link among colonialism, African state formation, ethnic fragmentation and 
the prevalence of conflicts will be explored. Thirdly, some of the major forms of conflicts in 
Africa and their historical root causes will be highlighted by using the Horn of Africa as a case 
study. Finally, this chapter concludes by indicating the possible roles and limitations of 
conflict early warning in monitoring conflicts with historical roots causes associated with the 
era of colonialism.  
3.2. Colonial Boundaries and African Conflicts 
Pre-colonial Africa was characterized with the presence of a wide range of political 
communities or entities which had some “aspects of statehood”99 and “approximate, in a 
rudimentary form, to the Westphalian conception of statehood.”100 According to David 
Francis, these pre-colonial political communities were described with variety of terms such as 
“city states, kingdoms, autocracies, vice royalties, confederations, peoples, theocracies, 
empires, sultanates, dynasties, nomadic confederations, pastoral communities, clans, tribes, 
warlords, semi-autonomous vassal states, tributary states, sub-dynasties, sub-kingdoms and 
state-less societies.”101 Some of the most notable political entities in pre-colonial Africa include 
the Mali, Shonghai and Sokoto Empires, the Ashanti Kingdom, the Benin City-State and the 
Oyo Caliphates in West Africa; the Bakongo Kingdom in Central Africa; the Ethiopian 
empire, the Islamic Sultanate of Sudan and the Buganda Kingdom in Eastern Africa102(See 
Figure 3.1 for African pre-colonial political entities). 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
98 Francis, Uniting Africa, 39. 
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ambe J. Njoh, Tradition, Culture and Development in Africa: Historical Lessons for Modern Development Planning 
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Figure 3.1: African Political Entities before the Scramble103 
 
 
With regard to territoriality, the “notion of frontiers as defined lines was virtually non-
existent”104 in these pre-colonial political entities and “few of the present boundaries of Africa 
existed”105 prior to the arrival of European colonialists. Most of the pre-colonial boundaries 
were generally considered to have been “fluid”106 in the sense that their demarcation and 
location depended on the relative strength and power of the local African kingdoms, 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2006), 110. 
103 Source: James Burns, Robert O. Collins and Erik Christopher Ching (eds.), Historical Problems of Imperial Africa 
(Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1994), 7. 
104 Steven R. Ratner, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and Borders of New States”, American Journal of 
International Law 90, no. 4 (1996): 595. 
105 Ieuan Griffiths, “The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries”, The Geographical Journal 152, No. 2 
(1986), 204.   
106 Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance”, 680. 
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chiefdoms and other forms of state structures identified earlier. According to Yoon, this 
started to gradually change with the advent of European colonialists who “drew boundaries in 
the African territories, which they acquired by conquest, occupation, treaties with African 
rulers (kings, chiefs, and sultans), or purchase.”107 
 
Informed by the decision of the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 that “laid down the rules for 
the European partition of the continent,”108 European colonial powers such as Britain, 
Germany and France created the existing African boundaries by entering border treaties 
among themselves often without any form of consultation with the existing political entities in 
the continent. Almost in all cases of demarcation, European colonizers did not take into 
account the “ethno-cultural, geographical, and ecological realities of Africa”109 and they 
“necessarily ignored factors which are generally considered relevant to the partitioning of 
land.”110 In describing such flawed process of demarcation that resulted in the creation of 
existing African boundaries, Herbst maintained that:   
      In many cases, mistakes in partitioning were made because the colonialists were misinformed about the 
geography of the area. In other cases, they adopted the simplest rules to divide the territory without 
taking time to consider demographic, ethnographic, or topographic factors.111 
 
 
The artificial boundaries created by European colonialists in the above manner later 
became applicable on the newly-formed independent African states following the 
establishment of the Organization for African Unity in 1963 which decided to preserve the 
colonial borders upholding the principle of Uti Possidetis.112 Though OAU’s original 
                                                 
107 Ibid., 675. 
108 Ieuan Griffiths, “The Scramble for Africa: Inherited Political Boundaries”, The Geographical Journal 152, No. 2 
(1986), 204.   
109 Herbst, “The Creation and Maintenance”, 675. 
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intention was to avoid possible conflicts among neighboring African states over the 
location of their boundaries, the decision to uphold the colonial borders had the reverse 
effect since the borders became a major cause of conflict as will be discussed afterwards.  
 
3.3 Colonialism, State Formation and Conflicts in Africa 
Besides the creation of artificial boundaries, another enduring legacy of European colonialism 
was the imposition of state formation on the African continent. Albeit the existence of earlier 
forms of political organization highlighted earlier, state formation in Africa in its current form 
is undeniably “the creation of European colonialism.”113  
 
As opposed to their European counterparts which were born out of “the natural and 
organic”114 process of nation and state formation, African nations and states are “geographical 
units created by European imperialists who divvied up Africa beginning at the Congress of 
Berlin in 1885, partitioning Africa into entirely artificial territorial units.”115 “Whereas these 
units served the geo-economic and geo-political interests of imperial Europe, they had the 
effect within Africa of arbitrarily dividing already established communities on the one hand or 
uniting essentially dissonant communities on the other hand.”116 Consequently such form of 
artificial, forced, and unnatural creation of the states led to the formation of very unstable 
nation-states in the continent117 in which “nation and states have not cohered.”118  
 
On more practical terms, colonial state formation is said to have various ramifications for the 
                                                 
113 Francis, Uniting Africa, 40. 
114 This refers to long evolutionary process of state formation which was mediated by bloody wars, conflicts and 
constitutional processes. 
115 Ricardo R. Laremont, “The Causes of Warfare and the Implications of Peacekeeping in Africa,” In Ricardo L. 
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prevalence of violent conflicts in the continent by creating a potentially conflictual 
environment in the continent at least in two forms. Firstly, as indicated earlier, colonial state 
formation separated similar ethno-linguistic groups which later entered into conflicts with 
other groups in their respective sub-regions vying for unity with their “ethnic brethren.” 
Secondly, colonial state formation also “lumped together peoples of diverse cultures and 
traditions”119 resulting in a highly diversified and unstable assortment of group identities 
within a single state. According to Francis M. Deng, the diversities thus created by the state 
formation process in turn proved to be one of the major sources of conflicts “due to gross 
inequalities in the sharing of power, natural resources, and development opportunities”120 as 
well as the absence of a cohesive social fabric which commits the loyalty of ethnic and other 
forms of group identities to the central state.121  As will be discussed later, state formation in 
Africa which had a flawed start from the beginning contributed directly and indirectly to the 
genesis of most of the conflicts in the continent ranging from territorial disputes to ethnic and 
secessionist conflicts. 
 
3.4 Colonialism, Ethnic Diversification and Conflicts 
European colonialism also contributed to the ethnic fragmentation of the continent which in 
turn played a role in the proliferation of ethnic conflicts in most parts of Africa.122 Colonialism 
fostered ethnic fragmentation and ethnic conflicts in various forms. Firstly, as shown earlier, 
the imposition of colonial boundaries on the continent “which was drawn with little or no 
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consideration to the actual distribution of indigenous ethno-cultural groups123 divided similar 
cultural and ethno-linguistic groups into different colonial territories. Following their 
preservation in the wake of decolonization, such ethnically-divisive territories created “some 
of the most ethnically fragmented states in the world”124 which are considered to have higher 
potential for ethnic conflicts.125 In this regard, colonial state formation in Nigeria provides a 
classical example depicting the link between ethnic fragmentation and conflicts. As shown by 
Ali A. Mazrui, the British colonialism created the Nigerian state which was composed of 
“three major nations and many smaller ones”126 including “the Yoruba in the West which were 
very different from the Muslim Hausa in the North, who in turn were quite distinct from the 
Ibo in the East.”127 According to Mazrui, “this artificial mixture led to one of Africa’s greatest 
human tragedies, the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70”128, that followed in the wake of an 
aborted secessionist attempt of the Ibo-dominated Biafra region. 
 
Secondly, colonial policies also fostered ethnic fragmentation by promoting ethnic sentiment 
among Africans with the purpose of discouraging a feeling of unity among Africans.129 
According to Tangie Nsoh Fonchingong, the colonial state employed various strategies to this 
end including “classifying ethnic groups and insisting that official forms carry information 
about the ethnic origin of individuals, disaggregating ethnic groups into the various subgroups, 
and favoring some groups over others.”130 In the wake of the departure of the colonialists, 
some African states consequently found themselves in a situation of immense ethnic 
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fragmentation and diversification which, coupled with other socio-political factors, ignited 
into violent ethnic conflicts as in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. 
 
3.5 Conflicts in the Horn: A Case Study 
As shown above, European colonial rule had resulted in the “inevitable problems of state-
making and nation-building among disparate peoples and in contested territory where there 
were cultural links with people across those borders.”131 While its manifold consequences are 
observed almost in all parts of Africa, the Horn of Africa would serve as a classical illustration 
of the impacts of European colonialism particularly in relation to the prevalence of conflicts.  
 
The causes of conflicts in the Horn of Africa are as diverse and complex as in the rest of the 
continent. Whereas historical legacies of colonialism are important factors in explaining the 
prevalence of conflicts in the Horn, the stability of the sub-region has also been constantly 
undermined also by other factors such as such as socio-economic underdevelopment, super 
power involvement during the Cold War, and mutual culture of interference in the affairs of 
neighboring states.132 The sub-region has also witnessed a wide array of conflicts such as 
secessionist, irredentist, territorial disputes, and ethnic conflicts. Consequently a brief 
overview of the major types of conflicts as well as their causes will be provided in this section 
by focusing on those conflicts which have their roots in the historical legacies of colonialism. 
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3.5.1 Territorial Disputes 
Owing largely to their arbitrary nature, some of the international boundaries drawn by 
Europeans later became major “bones of contention” among neighboring countries in the 
Horn of Africa. Most of these disputes were often regarding the location of the international 
boundaries and were considered to “have their roots in the European colonialism.”133 Similar 
to other territorial disputes elsewhere in the world, these disputes were generally preceded by 
territorial claims which were usually based on “pre-colonial history, common ethnicity, 
incomplete delimitation of the boundary, multiple colonial documents defining the boundary, 
different interpretations of the delimitation treaty, or violation of the principle of uti possidetis 
by the former colonial power.”134  
 
The most notable cases of territorial disputes in the sub-region are the Somalia-Ethiopia 
(1976-8) and the Ethiopia-Eritrea (1998-2000) border disputes. Though the former is also 
conceived as an irredentist conflict135, both exemplify major territorial disputes which resulted 
from a combination of factors such as incomplete delimitation of the boundaries and different 
interpretations of the colonial delimitation treaty.136 
3.5.2. Civil Wars and Ethnic Conflicts 
 
 The civil wars137 in the sub-region are multi-dimensional and are often motivated with factors 
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related to cultural, ethnic, and religious identities as well as economic deprivations and absence 
of political representations. Most of these underlying factors are in turn often rooted in the 
process of state formation and colonial boundaries discussed earlier as vividly illustrated with 
the cases of the civil wars in Sudan (between the North and South Sudan) and in Somalia. 
 
In the case of the Sudan, the civil war is portrayed essentially as “a conflict of identities 
between the Arabized and Islamic North and the South which is more indigenously African in 
race, culture and religion with some element of Christianity.”138 Even though, a number of 
internal and external forces are responsible for the creation of such conflicting forms of 
identities, European colonialism is noted to have contributed significantly to the 
fragmentation of the Sudan along the North-South divide resulting in Sudan’s “national 
identity crisis.”139 In this regard, Francis M. Deng noted the role of British colonialism in 
creating an isolated sense of identity in the South by arguing that the “British did not develop 
the South, but kept it isolated from the North as ‘Closed District’ allowing it to evolve along 
indigenous lines.”140 
 
In the case of the Somalia, the country has been a scene of bloody and contracted conflict 
among various groups which aligned themselves along ethnic and clan affiliations as well as 
religious beliefs. Similar to the case of Sudan, some of the historical legacies of colonialism 
also underlie the civil war in Somalia. Most notable in this regard is the impact of colonialism 
in creating the unnatural divide among the previously “ethnically and religiously 
homogeneous” Somalis which were artificially divided into French, Italian and British Somalis. 
Coupled with various forms of allegiance to clan and ethnic identities other than the central 
state, the division along those colonial lines weakened the national cohesion among Somalis 
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which in turn fueled and sustained the civil war which followed in the wake of the fall of the 
Mohammed Siyad Barre regime in 1991.141 
3.5.3 Secessionist Wars 
The Horn of Africa has been the scene of secessionist wars whose genesis can be traced once 
again to the era of European colonialism. The most notable example of secessionist war is the 
case of Eritrea which achieved its independence from Ethiopia in 19991 after more than thirty 
years of armed struggle. The genesis of this specific conflict can be squarely located at colonial 
policy of Italy which administered Eritrea beginning of the 1890s until its handover of its 
colonial territories including Eritrea to the Allied Powers following its defeat in the Second 
World War. During their occupation, the Italians fostered a separate political and national 
identity in Eritrea distinct from Ethiopia which claimed Eritrea and other colonial territories 
in the region as its “provinces on the grounds that prior to the European partition of the 
Horn of Africa in the nineteenth century most of this area was more or less under the 
Ethiopian Emperors’ effective sway.”142 Though the Eritrean war of secession got its 
conclusion with the attainment of Eritrea’s separate statehood, the sub-region is still home to 
other small-scale secessionist conflicts as in the cases of the Oromo and Ogaden which are 
struggling for their respective independence from Ethiopia 
 
3.5.4 Irredentist Conflicts 
Faced “with the same arbitrariness of borders inherited from European colonial rule”143, the 
Horn of Africa has also witnessed the separation of peoples of the same ethno-linguistic 
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origin who “would otherwise have lived together.”144 In the wake of the departure of the 
colonialist, the “desire for unification”145 among those people with ethnic commonalities has 
eventually led to irredentist146 conflicts in some parts of the sub-region. A very clear 
illustration of this fact is to be found in the case of Somalia which aspired to unite all Somali-
speaking people who were separated into four distinct political entities of Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Somalia.  
 
Following the independence of Somalia in 1960, the country’s leaders “rejected the legitimacy 
of their western borders”147 and used ethnicity as a basis for its claim of territories in parts of 
Ethiopia and Kenya.148 Somalia’s claim of territories later resulted in the Ethiopian-Somalia 
war of 1977 which ensued over contested ownership of the Ogaden region which is home to 
ethnic Somalis. Nevertheless, Somalia’s irredentist claims to territories within Ethiopia and 
Kenya failed to materialize in the face of stiff resistance especially from Ethiopia which 
managed to mobilize its population against the Somali invasion.  
 
3.6 Early Warning and African Conflicts  
In the previous parts, an attempt was made to provide a highly concise and generalized 
discussion of African conflicts by specifically focusing on their historical origin which is often 
traced to the various facets of the colonial legacy. The discussion showed how Europe’s 
imperial past impacted the social and political stability of contemporary Africa and attributed 
the root causes of various forms of conflicts in the continent to the various relics of the 
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colonial era. In fact, the attempt in the previous parts was not to establish a facile connection 
that puts the blame on European colonialism for each and every conflict in Africa. It was 
rather to highlight the historical and structural contexts of the conflicts which are essentially 
required in the anticipation and subsequent prevention of conflicts through the use of early 
warning systems. After all, an effective conflict early warning system is based on a well-
informed cognition of the conflicts to be monitored including their historical context. Before 
moving to the next chapter, this part concludes by indicating the potential roles and 
limitations of conflict early warning in anticipating and preventing violent conflicts with 
historical roots and causes as indicated earlier. 
 
According to studies149 conducted on the prevention, management and resolution of violent 
conflicts, most conflicts undergo through various stages or phases of conflicts which can be 
broadly categorized as pre-conflict, in-conflict and post-conflict phases150 (See Figure 3.2 for 
stages of conflict). As shown in these studies, there are also a wide range of intervention tools 
that should be applied at specific stages of conflicts151 (See Table 3.1 for Conflict Prevention: 
Phases, Action, and Goals). 
 
In the case of conflict early warning, the studies indicated that it is one major intervention tool 
                                                                                                                                                    
148 Yoon, “European Colonialism and Territorial Disputes”, 82. 
149 See for example, Veronique Dudouet, “Transitions from Violence to Peace: Revisiting Analysis and 
Intervention in Conflict Transformation”, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 
Report No. 15, 2006.  http://www.berghof-center.org/uploads/download/br15e.pdf?LANG=e&id=301, 
accessed on August 3, 2009; Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflict (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 1996); David 
Carment and Patrick James, “Ethnic Conflict and the International Level: Causation, Prevention and 
Peacekeeping”, in David Carment and Patrick James (eds.), Peace in the Midst of Wars: Preventing and Managing 
International Ethnic Conflicts (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press.1998a). 
150 Other phases or stages of conflicts which fall into the three broad categories of pre-conflict, in-conflict and 
post-conflicts stages include latent conflict stages, conflict emergence stages, escalation and institutionalization 
stage, failed peace-making efforts stages, hurting stalemate stage, de-escalation stage, negotiation stage, settlement 
stage, and peace-building and reconciliation stages. Solomon Hussein, “The Role of External Intervention in 
Ethnic Conflicts”, Center for International Political Studies (CIPS) Issue Paper, 2007. Available at CIPS official 
website: http://www.cips.up.ac.za/files/conference/papers/KTP_Prof_Hussein_Solomon_CiPS.pdf, (accessed 
August 30, 2009); Beyond Intractability Knowledge Base Project, “Stages of Conflicts”, 
http://www.beyondintractability.org/action/essays.jsp?nid=2075, (accessed August 24, 2009). 
 37 
 
 
that needs to be applied at the pre-conflict stage of conflict formation when the conflicts are 
still at their latent or initial stages152 to identify potential crises through “tracking of 
background (structural) conditions that constitute root causes of tension and crises as well as 
dynamic factors or accelerators, which may exacerbate the underlying conditions, driving up 
tensions.”153 
Figure 3.2. Stages of Conflicts154 
 
 
As will be further highlighted in the coming chapters, structural causes of conflicts refer to 
“long-term factors underlying violent conflicts”155 and include considerations such as ethnic 
politics, bad or illegitimate governance, lack of political participation, lack of equal economic 
and social opportunities, and inequitable access to resource wealth.156 Most of these structural 
factors are largely related (but not limited) to the legacies of European colonialism such as 
colonial state formation, ethnic and cultural fragmentation as indicated earlier in this chapter.  
And the importance of conflict early warning systems in the context of African conflicts 
emanate from its capability to identify both structural and immediate causes of conflict as 
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indicated above. 
 
Table 3.1. Conflict Prevention: Phases, Action, and Goals157 
Phases Conditions Actions Goals 
Conflict 
Formation 
Latent Conflict/ 
Unstable 
Conditions 
Early warning, Preventive 
Diplomacy, Preventive 
Deployment 
Mitigate and 
Stabilize 
Conflict 
Escalation 
Sporadic 
Violence 
Crisis Management, Crisis 
Intervention  
De-escalate/ 
Reduce  
Violence 
Conflict 
Endurance 
Intense Armed 
Conflict 
Negotiation, Peace-Keeping, 
Peace Enforcement 
Control and 
Contain 
Violence 
Conflict 
Termination 
Ceasefire Negotiation/ Peace-Keeping  Prevent 
Recurrence 
Conflict 
Transformation 
Conflict 
Resolution 
New Institutions and 
Projects/ Peace-building 
Address 
Underlying 
Sources of 
Conflict 
 
 
 
Consequently drawing both on the discussion on the application of early warning as an 
intervention tool as well as the discussion on historical root causes of conflicts, this chapter 
concludes by making the following caveats on the limitations of conflict early warning in 
serving its preventive purpose in the case of African conflicts. Firstly, conflict early warning is 
to be applied restrictedly to violent crises which are still in “pre-conflict stages” by virtue of 
the specificity of early warning as an intervention tools as well as the impracticality of 
instituting early warning monitoring mechanisms (both human and technical) in already 
escalated conflicts. In other words, higher levels of conflict intensification preclude the use of 
conflict early warning systems in full-blown conflicts such as the Darfur or in the ongoing 
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conflicts in Somalia. In such cases, precedence is to be given to other intervention tools such 
as negotiations and peace-keeping rather than conflict early warning systems.  
 
Secondly, the applicability of conflict early warning systems is also significantly weakened in 
stateless situations or in the case of failed states such as Somalia given the crucial role of states 
in conflict early warning and prevention. After all, the effectiveness of early warning depends, 
among other things, on the active role played by the states both as members of an early 
warning system and as individual political entities which have the potential to participate in 
various preventive activities ranging from facilitating the collection of early warning 
information to the provision of timely response action.  
 
Nevertheless, such seemingly restricted applicability of conflict early warning systems should 
by no means undermine their utility as important tools of operational conflict prevention in 
Africa since the continent is under a constant threat not only from existing conflicts but also 
from new ones which can be identified “when there is still time for investing in appropriate 
structural development and building conflict management capacity.”158 
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Chapter Four: The Practice of Conflict Early Warning in Africa: an 
Overview 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a concise discussion of the historical root causes and types of 
African conflicts by emphasizing the impact of European colonialism in causing, sustaining 
and/or aggravating some of the major conflicts in the continent. Additionally, the chapter 
explored the applicability of conflict early warning in the anticipation and prevention of these 
conflicts.  
 
Moving on, this chapter provides a brief survey of conflict early warning practice in Africa 
with the purpose of indicating its historical development and current level of practice in the 
continent. The chapter starts by briefly highlighting the earliest attempt of the OAU to 
implement conflict early warning at a continent level. Subsequently, other successive efforts 
both at the continental and sub-continental levels will be discussed by focusing on three of the 
major early warning systems currently in operation in Africa, namely the CEWS, CEWARN 
and ECOWARN.  
 
4.2. OAU and Conflict Early Warning  
The first major effort towards implementing a conflict early warning system for Africa was 
initiated when the Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided to establish the Mechanism 
for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution.159 According to Chris J. Bakwweshegha, 
“the decision to establish such a mechanism within the OAU was reached against the 
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backdrop conviction that African states could not improve their socio-economic performance 
in an ocean of wars, conflicts and domestic tension.”160  As an overarching continental security 
arrangement, the Mechanism was meant to “provide the OAU with robust framework for 
anticipating conflicts and wars in Africa.”161 It was also charged with undertaking peacemaking 
and peace-building efforts during conflicts and in post-conflicts situations.162 In order to 
translate the above broad security objectives of the Mechanism, the OAU sought to establish 
a number of institutions including an early warning unit. To this end the OAU created a 
Division for Conflict Management and formalized an associated financial facility, the Peace 
Fund.163 
 
Nevertheless, the OAU did not make substantial progress in operationalizing its conflict early 
warning unit as part of its revitalized security arrangement apart from its limited success in 
establishing the “Situation Room within the Conflict Management Center that was tasked in 
collecting information.”164 In fact as Christian Nitschke Smith has indicated, the Organization 
never managed to establish a fully operational early warning system and this task was passed 
on to its successor, the AU, following an overall institutional reform in 2002.165 Whereas the 
OAU had aspired to establish a full-fledged conflict early warning system or unit which was 
envisaged to enhance its capacity to prevent conflicts in Africa, a wide range of factors 
prevented the Organization from fulfilling its aspirations. Apart from capacity and financial 
constraints, three major factors were suggested to explain OAU’s “meager” performance in 
the case of conflict early warning in Africa. 
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Firstly, the inclination of many regimes in the region to restrict public access to an inordinately 
broad range of information substantially slowed down OAU’s progress in establishing an early 
warning system for the continent.166 Secondly, “OAU’s commitment to non-interference in 
the internal affairs of other countries as maintained in its Charter”167 also hampered the 
Organization’s efforts to collect reliable data and information, as well as timely intervention.168 
Thirdly, the fear of loss of credibility if a prediction proved incorrect also became an 
operational impediment to the early efforts of the OAU with regards to conflict early 
warning.169 Consequently, operationalizing an early warning system at a Pan African level got 
its realization only after the OAU was transformed into the African Union as will be discussed 
in the coming section. 
 
4.3. From OAU to the AU: Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) in the new 
African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) 
With the onset of the new millennium, there was a growing recognition that “the OAU was 
largely incapable of meeting the challenges facing the continent.”170 The Organization was 
deemed incapable of dealing with existing challenges of violent conflicts as well as new threats 
such as the growing forces of globalization, the dominance of neo-liberal doctrines, 
international terrorism, and other threats to general human security.171 Consequently, intent on 
meeting these new and existing challenges, the OAU embarked on a series of transformative 
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process which culminated in the realization of the African Union on July 9, 2002. Among 
other things, the transformation of the OAU into the African Union led to the “adoption of 
new norms172 to govern member states interactions on matters of peace, security and 
development.”173 The transformation also led to the establishment of new institutions to 
enforce these norms.174 
  
With regards to peace and security, the Constitutive Act and the Peace and Security Protocol 
(PSC Protocol) of the newly transformed African Union provided for the establishment of 
new institutions that are entrusted with enforcing the Union’s basic norms and objectives.175 
Chief among the resultant institutions deemed vital for shouldering the peace and security 
challenges of the continent is the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which, as 
indicated at the introduction of this study, incorporates other sub-regional peace and security 
mechanisms in the continent.176 And the CEWS, which in turn builds upon other sub-regional 
early warning mechanisms, serves as the main early warning organ of the APSA and is 
intended to enhance AU’s capacity in conflict prevention by “providing the Chairperson of 
the AU Commission with information in a timely manner so that he/she can advise the Peace 
and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security and recommend 
best courses of action.”177 
 
In terms of its institutional composition, the CEWS comprises the Situation Room at the AU 
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Headquarters in Addis Ababa as well as the observation and monitoring units of the Regional 
Mechanisms (See Figure 4.1). According to the PSC Protocol, the latter are to be linked to the 
former through appropriate means of communication178 and they are also envisaged to 
“continuously collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation 
Room.”179 Ideally, the AU is expected to initiate response action to a threat of violence 
conflicts in the continent based on such multi-layered early warning data collection and 
analysis as highlighted earlier.  
 
Figure 4.1. Pictorial Representation of the CEWS180 
 
 
Operationalizing the CEWS as proposed in the Peace and Security Protocol was started in 
2003 and went through various processes with close cooperation and consultation of a wide 
range of actors including member states, the regional mechanisms, academic and research 
institutes, the United Nations, and civil society organizations.181 Currently the CEWS has 
                                                 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid.  
180 Source: Cillers, “Towards a Continental Early Warning System”, 46. 
181 Engle and Gomes Porto, “The African Union’s”, (without page numbers). 
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reached a level of institutional development in which “it has already implemented an 
important part of the data and information gathering infrastructure and it has begun 
producing standardised early warning analysis and policy response options in the form of 
Early Warning Reports”182 Additionally, based on its coordinating and facilitating role183, the 
CEWS is currently in the process of harmonizing the practice of conflict early warning 
undertaken at sub-regional levels which is subsequently discussed as follows. 
 
4.4. Conflict Early Warning at Sub-Regional level in Africa 
Operationalizing conflict early warning systems which was initiated at the continental level as 
indicated earlier was replicated at sub-regional levels with the various Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) following suit in establishing their respective early warning mechanisms. 
Similar to the continental one, the main focus of the sub-regional early warning initiatives is 
generally conceptualized as “alerting a recognized authority184 to the threat of a new (or 
renewed) armed conflict at a sufficiently early stage so that the authority can attempt to take 
preventive action.”185  
 
Nevertheless, the various RECs are at different levels of progress in terms of implementing 
their early warning and conflict analysis mechanisms.186 While some like the ECOWAS and 
IGAD are more advanced in terms of implementing major parts of their early warning data 
                                                 
182 Ibid. 
183 African Union, The CEWS Handbook, 35. 
184 Recognized authority often refers to the respective regional or sub-regional formal decision-making formal 
bodies such as the OAU, AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, etc. which oversee the early warning mechanisms. Walter A. 
Dorn, “Early (and Late) Warning by the UN Secretary General: Article 99 Revisited”, In Albrecht Schnabel and 
David Carment (eds.), Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), 317. 
185 Ibid. 
186 For the full discussion on the progress of implementation, refer to AU [African Union] CMD [Conflict 
Management Division] (eds.), “Status of Implementation of Early Warning Systems in the Regional Economic 
Communities: Background Paper No. 4”, In Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the 
Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a). 
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collection and analysis structures187, others such as the CENSAD and COMESA are still at the 
preliminary stage of the process. 188 Subsequently, a brief introduction of the CEWARN and 
ECOWARN189 as two of the most advanced early warning systems in the continent will be 
presented. A more in-depth treatment of operational aspects of the two systems aimed in 
depicting the different approaches to early warning in the continent, nonetheless, is to be 
included in the next chapter.  
4.4.1. CEWARN/IGAD 
The Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was established in 2002 as 
an early warning component of the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) 
which “superseded in 1996 the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Development(IGADD), which was founded in 1986 primarily to react to the recurring and 
severe droughts and other natural disasters in the Horn of Africa.”190  
 
Following a revitalization process which resulted in the above mentioned transformation, 
IGAD’s mandate was broadened to include the promotion of “peace and stability in the sub-
region and creation of mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, management and 
resolution of interstate and intrastate conflicts through dialogue.”191 Consequently at the 8th 
Summit of IGAD Heads of States and Government, IGAD decided to establish the 
CEWARN as a conflict early warning and early response mechanism as part of its revitalized 
mandate on development, peace and security.192 In terms of its mandate, CEWARN is 
primarily tasked by the IGAD to “receive and share information concerning potentially 
                                                 
187 AU- CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 21; Fanta, “The Capacity of African”, 6. 
188 Ibid. 
189 The CEWARN is the conflict early warning system of the IGAD for the Horn of Africa region. Likewise, the 
ECOWARN is the early warning mechanism of the ECOWAS for Western Africa.  
190 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning”, 18. 
191 IGAD, Agreement Establishing the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Nairobi: March 21, 1996), Article 7. 
192 CEWARN, Official Website at: http://www.cewarn.org/index_files/Page355.htm, (accessed on 23rd August, 
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violent conflicts as well as their outbreak and escalation in the IGAD region.”193 
 
4.4.2. Early Warning in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
ECOWARN (ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network), is the conflict early warning 
mechanism of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which was 
founded in 1975 as regional grouping of fifteen member states194, primarily tasked with the 
promotion of economic integration.195 Following an organizational reform in 1993, the 
ECOWAS expanded its activities in the domain of peace and security management “against 
the backdrop of an altered international environment and regime change in numerous 
member states.”196 
 
The rationale for the establishment of the ECOWARN as a sub-regional early warning 
mechanism is to be found in the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution, Peace-keeping and Resolutions adopted in 1999, which 
stipulated for “the strengthening of the cooperation between Member States in the fields of 
preventive diplomacy, early warning, prevention of cross-border crimes, peace-keeping, and 
equitable management of natural resources.”197 According to the Chapter IV of the Protocol 
which called for the establishment of an Early Warning System, the ECOWARN is mandated 
“to detect, monitor and analyze signs of threats or breakdown in relations within or between 
member states.”198 
                                                                                                                                                    
2009). 
193 CEWARN, CEWARN Strategy: 2007-2011(Addis Ababa: The CEWARN Unit, 2006), 14. 
194 Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
195 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning”, 16. 
196 Ibid. 
197 AU- CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 30. 
198 ECOWAS, The Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention and Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and 
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4.5. Conclusion 
Following the discussion on the nature and cause of conflicts in Africa, this chapter attempted 
to briefly highlight the history and practice of conflict early warning in Africa by indicating its 
application both at the continental and sub-regional levels. To this end, the chapter provided 
an introduction into some of the major early warning systems currently in operation in the 
continent and briefly highlighted the main legal provisions and processes that led to the 
establishment of the CEWS, CEWARN and the ECOWARN respectively. Whereas the 
discussion in this chapter is meant to create the appropriate historical context needed for 
conceptualizing the main topic of this study, divergences in the early warning practices in the 
continent as well as their implications on the process of harmonization will be shown in the 
coming chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Security (Lome, 1999), Chapter IV. 
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Chapter Five: Comparative Analysis of CEWARN and ECOWARN as 
Operational Early Warning Mechanisms in Africa 
5.1 Introduction 
Prior to addressing the main research questions that deal with the areas and modalities of 
achieving harmonization among the conflict early warning mechanisms, this chapter aims to 
show the different approaches to the practice of conflict early warning in Africa. To this end, 
this chapter will analyze the CEWARN and the ECOWARN in a comparative perspective. 
Whereas the main focus in this chapter is on these two systems given their relative 
institutional advancement, relevant elements from other systems in the continent will be 
included as appropriate for the discussion. The findings of this chapter will be employed as a 
basis for indicating the areas and modalities of harmonizing the systems in the final chapter of 
this study. 
 
The comparative analysis of the CEWARN and the ECOWARN is based on some of the 
major parameters199 essential in describing operational conflict early warning systems which 
are broadly grouped into the following categories:  
• Types of early warning models in use and organization of the system; 
• Operational and geographic focus; 
• Main early warning activities and methodologies; 
• Institutional set-up; 
• Linkages with response strategies. 
 
The comparative analysis is conducted through the interpretation of primary data such as 
                                                 
199 Nyheim, Preventing Violence, 48. 
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Protocols, Standard Operating Manuals and official declarations. Additionally, it is also 
significantly informed by data obtained from the literature review. In terms of organization, 
chapter five is structured in the following manner; first a point-by-point comparative analysis 
of the two systems based on the parameters identified earlier will be provided. Subsequently, 
the major findings of the comparative analysis will be summarized to indicate convergences 
and divergences in terms of conflict early warning practice in the continent.  
 
5.2 Nature and Type of the Early Warning Systems 
CEWARN and ECOWARN are analyzed in this section based on the type of early warning 
models in use and the location and organization of the systems. In terms of early warning 
models in use, CEWARN’s model200 is characterized as a combination of both predictive and 
risk assessment models with early response component.201 Whereas CEWARN’s mandate and 
use of a number of social, political and economic indicators to anticipate the escalation of a 
situation are the main expressions of the predictive nature of its model202, the utilization of 
these indicators as well as data on events to respond in a timely manner rendered the 
CEWARN early warning model to be characterized also as Risk and Capacity Assessments 
with Early Response Component.203 In the case of ECOWARN, its early warning module is 
categorized under risk assessment and early warning and investigative research by civil society 
due to its strong linkage with civil societies such as WANEP (West Africa Network for Peace 
Building204).205  
 
                                                 
200 Refer to Section 2.6 for the discussion on early warning modules. 
201 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning”, 28. 
202 Ibid., 10. 
203 Ibid., 28. 
204 WANEP is an active participant in ECOWARN in activities such as facilitating data collection and analysis as 
well as coordinating response. Ibid., 17. 
205 Ibid. 
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When it comes to the sectors from which they stem, both CEWARN and ECOWARN are 
characterized as inter-governmental early warning arrangements designed to “to bolster the 
ability to anticipate crises and initiate preventive measures”206 in the sub-regional organizations 
IGAD and ECOWAS respectively. Additionally, because of the “in-house location” of their 
systems, both CEWARN and ECOWARN are considered to belong207 to the Third 
Generation of Early Warning Systems in which “the entire system of data collection and 
analysis is based in the conflict areas and have a stronger response links.”208 
 
5.3 Operational Objective and Geographic Focus 
On a more general term, the objective of both CEWARN and ECOWARN can be 
characterized to be a similar one in that both aspire to inform decision-makers at various 
levels about the threat of violent conflicts in their geographical regions.209 Nevertheless, the 
two mechanisms differ when it comes to the kind of conflicts they monitor by their respective 
early warning mechanisms.  
 
In spite of its broad mandate210 and the prevalence of both inter- and intra-state conflicts in 
the region211, CEWARN currently focuses exclusively on “cross-border pastoral conflicts and 
cattle raiding” 212only. As shown by Ulf Terlinden, this proved to be a major source of critic 
since “these specific conflicts [pastoral conflicts] only represent a small segment of the multi-
                                                 
206 Nyheim, Preventing Violence, 34-35. 
207 In both CEWARN and ECOWARN, data collection and analysis is undertaken at the local, national and sub-
regional levels of their mechanisms in their member states.  
208 Nyheim, Preventing Violence, 19. 
209 As shown in Section 4.5.1 of this study, CEWARN is mandated to receive and share information concerning 
potential violent conflicts as well as their outbreak an escalation in the IGAD sub-region. The ECOWAS has also 
a similar mandate to “detect, monitor and analyze signs of threats or breakdown in relations within or between 
member states.” ECOWAS, The Protocol, Chapter IV. 
210 Refer foot note above for CEWARN’s broad mandate. 
211 The Horn of Africa region is generally characterized with the prevalence of violent conflicts. 
212 Fanta, “The Capacity of African”, 8. 
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faceted, highly integrated conflict system in the Horn of Africa.”213 CEWARN defends its 
decision to narrow down its mandate by claiming,  
Monitoring pastoral conflicts was the easiest entry point into the field of conflict prevention in 
East Africa. As most countries in the region are in tension with one another, embracing hardcore 
interstate or intra-state armed conflicts was considered a premature and impudent step.214  
 
On the contrary, the ECOWARN has a much broader and perhaps an ambitious focus on a 
wide range of issues and seeks to monitor “all aspects that affect peace and security”215in the 
West African sub-region. Reflecting this broader focus, the ECOWARN maintains that it 
seeks to “assess political (human rights, democracy), economic (food shortages), social 
(unemployment), security (arms flows, civil-military relations), and environment (drought, 
flooding) indicators on a daily basis.”216 
 
In terms of coverage, CEWARN can be considered to have a narrow geographical scope since 
its reporting areas do not cover all areas217 in the sub-region. CEWARN currently monitors 
pastoral and related conflicts in two selected reporting areas of the Karamoja and the Somali 
Clusters.218 Whereas the Karamoja Cluster comprises the border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Sudan and Uganda, the Somali Cluster comprises the cross-border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, 
and Somalia.219 The two Clusters are indicated in big and small boxes in Figure 5.1 
representing the Karamoja and Somali Clusters respectively.  
 
 
                                                 
213 Ulf Terlinden, “IGAD-Paper Tiger facing Gigantic Tasks”, Briefing Paper on International Development 
Cooperation for Africa Desk of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, available on: http://www.ulf-
terlinden.de/docs/Terlinden2004-IGAD-engl.pdf (accessed on August 12, 2009). 
214 Daniel Yifru, Director of IGAD’s Peace and Security Division, quoted in Fanta, “The Capacity of 
African”, 8. 
215 Zam Zam Nagujja Kasujja, “Expectations and Reality in Conflict Prevention”, in Walter Feichtinger and 
Predraj Jureković(eds.), Konfliktprävention zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit (Wien: Schriftenreihe der 
Landesverteidigungsakademie, 2007), 129. 
216 United Nations University, Capacity Survey, 69. 
217 Fanta, “The Capacity of African”, 8.  
218 Ibid. 
219 CEWARN, CEWARN Strategy, 16. 
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Figure 5.1. Areas of Conflict Monitoring in the Horn of Africa220  
 
 
  
On the other hand, as shown in figure 5.2, the ECOWARN has a wider geographical coverage 
and aspires to monitor all areas in the 15 member states through the use of the Zonal 
Offices221 which collect information from their respective focal areas in the sub-region.222 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
220 Source: Kasujja, “Expectations and Reality”, 120. 
221 The zonal information and reporting bureaus are located in Cotonou (covering Benin, Nigeria, and Togo); 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger), Monrovia (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ghana); 
and Banjul (The Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Senegal). AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 30. 
222 Ibid. 
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Figure 5.2. ECOWARN’s Offices and Monitoring Areas223 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4. Main Early Warning Activities and Methodology 
In terms of their overall early warning activities, both the CEWARN and ECOWARN are 
similar in that both seek to undertake monitoring and reporting of conflicts through the 
systematical specification, collection and analysis of data in their respective regions.224 With 
regards to early warning methodologies, there are both similarities and differences between the 
two systems and these will be discussed as follows. 
5.4.1. Data Collection  
Unlike the early warning mechanism for SADC225 which is “intelligence-based”226 and relies on 
military and national intelligence, both CEWARN and ECOWARN are open source 
                                                 
223 Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), “Interview with Mr. Augustine 
Sagna”, The Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) News Letter 4-5, no. 2, April - May 2009, available on: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/6/43014249.pdf, (accessed on August 20, 2009). 
224 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 25. 
225 Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is the regional organization for Southern Africa. 
226 United Nations University, Capacity Survey, 22-23. 
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monitoring mechanisms in which data collection is undertaken through the use of both 
structural and event indicators. Nonetheless, the two differ in the type of indicators they 
utilize for the collection of information in their respective sub-regions.227 
 
In terms of data collection methodology, CEWARN largely relies on media reports and field 
data collected by a network of Field Monitors (FMs)228 who collect229 both qualitative (violent 
event data) and quantitative (constant behavioural) information through identified indicators  
uniquely tailored to “track, monitor and analyze cross-border pastoral and related conflicts in 
the Horn of Africa region.”230 CEWARN’s indicators231 are designed to measure the 
interaction between structural, proximate, and short-term or immediate causes of conflicts in 
the sub-region.232 These indicators are analyzed and assessed in terms of their interplay with 
peace or cooperative developments in the areas of coverage.233  
 
In the case of ECOWARN, data collection234 is accomplished by a wide range of participants 
including “ECOWAS-trained civil liaison officers, members of civil society, and government 
representatives.”235 More importantly, the West Africa Network for Peace Building (WANEP), 
a network of civil organizations, serves as the main implementing partner coordinating the 
                                                 
227 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 45. 
228 The Field Monitors are trained in collecting information, categorizing and placing that information into 
prescribed reporting formats. AU [African Union] CMD [Conflict Management Division] (Eds.), “Status of the 
Implementation of Early Warning Systems in the Regional Economic Communities, Background Paper No.4”, in 
Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the African Union Continental Early 
Warning System (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a), 153. 
229 Since mid 2003, a total of thirty FMs have been deployed in CEWARN’s two current areas of reporting of the 
Karamoja and Somali Clusters. Fanta, “The Capacity of African”, 8. 
230 Kasujja, “Expectations and Reality”, 123. 
231 The full description of CEWARN’s indicators is to be found in Appendices B and C of this study. 
232 Abdelrahim A. Khalil, “Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture(s): The African Union and the Regional 
Economic Communities; the Case of CEWARN/IGAD”, Paper Presented for the Conference “Beyond the 
Year of Africa: Partnerships for Peace and Development in Africa- the International Community and African 
Agencies”, March 28-29 2006, Bradford, West Yorkshire, England. 
233 Ibid. 
234 The ECOWARN also employs a total of 94 pre-defined indicators used as a grid to analyze risks and rapidly 
detect security trends in the sub-region. OECD, “Interview with Mr. Augustine Sagna”, 3. 
235  OECD), “Interview with Mr. Augustine Sagna”, 3. 
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overall data collection in all the member states.236  
 
5.4.2. Conflict Analysis Methodology 
In both early warning mechanisms, conflict analysis is undertaken “applying the same Swiss 
Peace Foundation FAST model of early warning analysis”237 that is based on the “interaction 
of root causes, proximate, and intervening factors which may lead to armed conflict, hamper 
conflict mitigation, or provide a window of opportunity for de-escalation and peace-building 
efforts.”238 
Figure 5.3. FAST Conflict Analysis Methodology239 
 
 
In terms of specific tools of data analysis, both employ a similar qualitative data analysis tool 
                                                 
236 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 45. 
237 Kasujja, “Expectations and Reality”, 133.  
238 Krummenacher and Schmeidl, “Practical Challenges”, 8. 
239 Source: Ibid,. 9. 
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known as the Reporter240, which is “a network software program specifically designed for early 
warning purposes that allows data management and graphical display of event frequencies 
over time.”241 The Reporter also allows for qualitative and quantitative analysis of field data to 
identify developing trends and assists in tracking how changes in behavior are likely to lead to 
more tension and conflict, or cooperation.242 The use of such an automated electronic process 
of data analysis is justified by the claim “such statistic or graphic approach makes it easier to 
pass on messages to politicians who accept more easily a scientific analysis of the situation, 
rather than an analysis based on factual interpretations and/or theories.”243 
 
5.4.3. Early Warning Products 
Early warning products refer to outputs of the data collection and analysis processes which are 
often delivered in the form of briefs or reports. Their essentiality to conflict prevention in 
general and to the process of early warning in particular emanate from the fact they link early 
warning with response instruments and mechanisms by providing synthesized and actionable 
information about a threat of violence to policy makers.244 
 
From the perspective of early warning products, CEWARN can be considered to be more 
advanced than the ECOWARN since it is currently producing six types of early warning 
reports at various levels and frequencies245 including Country Updates, Alerts, Situation Briefs, 
Regional Cluster Reports, Annual Risk Assessment and Country Baseline Studies.246 (See Table 
5.1 for the list of CEWARN’s early warning products). 
                                                 
240 Kasujja, “Expectations and Reality”, 133.  
241 CEWARN, CEWARN Strategy, 23. 
242 Ibid. 
243 OECD, “Interview with Mr. Augustine Sagna”, 3-4. 
244 Such conception of early warning products is inspired by the restrictive defintion of early warning in Nyheim, 
Preventing Violence, 48.  
245 CEWARN, CEWARN Strategy, 23. 
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Table 5.1. List of Early Warning Products in CEWARN247 
Type of Report Frequency Level 
Alerts Immediately National/Regional 
Situation Briefs As the need arises National/Regional 
Country Updates Every four months National
Cluster Reports Every four months Regional
Annual Risk 
Assessment  
Annually National/Regional 
Country Baseline 
Studies 
For all new areas: and 
evaluation every 5 years 
National
 
 
On the other hand, ECOWARN is still in the process of implementing the modalities for 
producing such reports. According to the CEWS Handbook, ECOWARN’s situation-
reporting database and its incident report are both in trial or testing phase.248 But upon full 
implementation, the ECOWAS is also expected to produce “incident and situation reports, 
daily highlights, country profiles, policy briefs, monthly and quarterly reports.”249 
 
5.5. Institutional Set-Up  
Though both CEWARN/IGAD and ECOWARN/ECOWAS are claimed to have “an 
appropriate organic structure”250, there are variations in terms of the set-up and level of 
development of their institutional structures.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
246 Ibid. 
247 Source: CEWARN, CEWARN Strategy, 23. 
248 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 44.  
249 OECD, “Interview with Mr. Augustine Sagna”, 3-4. 
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When it comes to institutional set-up, CEWARN has a more elaborate structure that extends 
from the local to the sub-regional level (See Figure 5.4 for Organizational Structure of the 
CEWARN).  
 
Figure 5.4. CEWARN Institutional Structure251 
 
 
At the local level, the mechanism consists of Field Monitors (FM) and local committees which 
are tasked with implementation of response actions.252 Nationally, the CEWARN comprises 
the Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERUs)253, National Research 
Institutes (NRI) and Country Coordinators (CC).254 At the regional level, the CEWARN 
mechanism builds upon two regional coordinating structures namely the Technical Committee 
for Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of Permanent Secretaries, the policy-making 
                                                                                                                                                    
250 Fanta, “The Capacity of African”, 6. 
251 Source: CEWARN, CEWARN Strategy, 20. 
252 CEWARN, CEWARN Strategy, 20. 
253 CEWERUs serve as focal coordinating units operating within relevant Ministries of IGAD Member States 
and they are the responsible bodies for response initiatives to be implemented on a country level in close 
cooperation with local committees or sub-regional peace councils. Ibid., 19. 
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organ of the CEWARN which reports to the IGAD Council of Ministers.255 Thus, in light of 
the fact that most of these units are now fully or partially operational almost seven years after 
its establishment, the CEWARN mechanism was considered to be institutionally “one of the 
most advanced early warning mechanisms”256 in the continent. 
 
In the case of ECOWARN, whereas it is generally stipulated that it will be composed of “an 
Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC)257 based in Abuja, Nigeria as well as four Zonal 
Offices”258 as shown in Figure 5.5, the mechanism has not yet reached the level of institutional 
maturity comparable to CEWARN. According to the UN Capacity Assessment conducted in 
2009, ECOWARN’s Zonal Bureaus “are not yet functional and there is still a lack of technical 
and qualified staff to convert raw data into useful and predictive information.”259 ECOWARN 
expects to establish itself as a fully-integrated system by 2010.260  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
254 Ibid. 
255 Ibid. 
256 Fanta, “The Capacity of African”, 7. 
257 The OMC serves as the headquarter body of the ECOWARN and is responsible for data collection and 
analysis; and the drafting of up-to-date reports for the Executive Secretary that identify/outline possible 
emerging crises, monitor ongoing crises and post-crisis transitions. As integral parts of the system, the four zonal 
information and reporting bureaus are responsible for gathering information from their focal areas on a daily 
basis to be reported to the OMC. The zonal bureaus are located in Cotonou (covering Benin, Nigeria, and Togo); 
Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger), Monrovia (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Ghana); 
and Banjul (The Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Senegal). United Nations University, Capacity Survey, 69. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Ibid., 70. 
260 Ibid. 
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Figure 5.5. ECOWARN Structure261 
 
 
5.6. Linkage with Response 
As shown in Section 2.2 of this study, an effective early warning system is one which is linked 
to response mechanisms since “the ultimate goal of early warning is not to predict conflicts, 
but to prevent them.”262 Nonetheless, according to David Nyheim, in most of the early 
warning systems in Africa “beyond the delivery of early warning reports to the decision-
makers, established links between these early warning and response systems remains mostly 
unclear.”263  
 
Ideally, response in the context of CEWARN is envisaged to be undertaken at various levels 
(See Figure 5.4 for CEWARN Structure). On the national level, upon receiving early warning 
                                                 
261 Source: Kasujja, “Expectations and Reality”, 129. 
262 Matveeva, “Early Warning”, 30. 
263 Nyheim, Preventing Violence, 48. 
 62 
 
 
information, the national Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Unit (CEWERUs) 
initiate and coordinate responses in cooperation with the local structures, local committees, 
local leadership, civil organizations and community-based organizations in the area.264 At the 
regional level, the Technical Committee for Early Warning (TCEW) and the Committee of 
Permanent Secretaries (CPS) are responsible for coordinating actions to prevent an imminent 
conflict or de-escalate violence.265  
 
Nonetheless, whereas CEWARN is credited at least “formalizing a Protocol that integrates an 
early warning reporting within decision-making systems for response,”266 it has not yet “closed 
the gap between analysis, options and actions.”267 According to Tobias Debiel and Herbert 
Wulf, there still seems to be a glaring lack of adequate non-military capacities in CEWARN 268 
to intervene in order to prevent or end conflict269 and most of the response frameworks 
indicated earlier are partly only on paper.270 
 
In the case of ECOWARN, the mechanism has not yet ratified any protocol linking early 
warning with response during the time of this study. Nevertheless, it is generally maintained 
that response is to be undertaken by a wide range of actors at various levels most notably by 
the sub-regional body of the ECOWAS itself and civil society organizations such as WANEP. 
According to Zam Zam Nagujja Kasujja, the ECOWAS can undertake response actions 
“including military intervention and peace keeping through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), which has established itself as a force for peaceful security intervention in 
                                                 
264 CEWARN, CEWARN Strategy, 24. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Nyheim, Preventing Violence, 48. 
267 Cillers, “Continental Early Warning”, 14. 
268 CEWARN is not an exception in this regard and most early warning systems are also criticized for failing to 
result in effective response. 
269 Debiel and Wulf, “Conflict Early Warning”, 30. 
270 Ibid. 
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Liberia (twice), Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau.”271 In the case of civil society 
organizations, it is also generally conceived that they have the potential to respond to a threat 
of conflict by “providing information and advice to regional organisations, playing a mediatory 
role in resolution of inter-communal disputes, and joint brainstorming with decision-makers 
on a course of action to take.”272  
5.7. Conclusion 
Beyond a mere comparison, the discussion thus far in this chapter was an attempt to indicate 
the different approaches to conflict early warning in the continent. Additionally, it was also a 
way of exploring the main practical issues surrounding harmonization of the various 
mechanisms within the overarching framework of the Continental Early Warning System 
(CEWS) of the African Union.  
 
As the comparative analysis of the CEWARN and ECOWARN has shown, there are both 
similarities and differences in the way early warning is being undertaken in the two 
mechanisms. Generally speaking, similarities were exhibited in terms of overarching early 
warning mandates273; in the use of open sources for data collection; and in the methodology 
employed for conflict analysis274. On the other hand, major differences were observed in terms 
of considerations such as: the kind of conflicts monitored by the mechanisms; institutional 
set-up and level of development; current level of development of early warning products; and 
clarity of linkages with response strategies in the respective mechanisms.275  
 
Based on the above facts, it can be argued here that the differences and similarities shown 
                                                 
271 Kasujja, “Expectations and Reality”, 133. 
272 Matveeva, “Early Warning”, 33. 
273 The anticipation of prevention of conflicts through early warning in both cases. 
274 Both use the same Swiss Peace Foundation FAST model of conflict analysis. 
275 It is already shown in Sections 5.4.3, 5.5, and 5.6 that CEWARN has a relatively advanced institutional 
development; it has the capacity to deliver more early warning products; and ratified a Protocol outlining its 
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through the comparative analysis serve to illustrate divergences and convergences in conflict 
early warning practice in the continent with their own implications for harmonization of 
conflict early warning in Africa in as much as the various mechanisms are expected to operate 
in harmonized manner “with a shared and compatible early warning methodology, purpose 
and terminology”276 within the CEWS framework. On analytical level, the major differences 
shown earlier can also be conceived as precursors indicating the need for the creation of some 
form of consensus in terms of “institutional norms”277 and collective behaviour which are 
considered as prerequisites both for forming an integrated continental early warning 
arrangement via the CEWS and for the full-functionality of the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) as a security regime.278 
 
Against the background of the above assertions, the remaining major task of this study is to 
show how harmonization of conflict early warning is being undertaken by the AU in the face 
of anomalies in early warning practices as well as variations in terms of institutional norms and 
behaviors. To this end, the coming chapter will specifically deal with both the analytical and 
practical elements of overcoming these variations through the formation of knowledge-based 
consensus around the CEWS.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
response strategy.  
276 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 21. 
277 Institutional norms are broadly conceptualized as expectations of behavior acceptable within an institutional 
environment. Chee Yew Wong and Sakun Boon-itt, “The influence of institutional norms and environmental 
uncertainty on supply chain integration in the Thai automotive industry”, International Journal of Production Economics 
115, no. 2 (2008), 400-410. 
278 This analytical observation is also informed by the work of Ulf Engel and João Gomes Porto who have 
shown, using the concept of regime theory in international relations, the effective and full functionality of APSA 
(which also includes the CEWS) as a security regime depends both on legally agreed upon rules, principles, 
norms on the one hand and institutional behaviours on the other hand. Engle and Gomes Porto, “The African 
Union’s”, (without page numbers). 
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Chapter Six: Areas, Modalities and Challenges of Harmonization of 
Conflict Early Warning in Africa 
6.1. Introduction 
As hinted in the previous part, the overarching objective of this part of the study is to explore 
how the African Union attempts to harmonize the various conflict early warning mechanisms 
as constituent parts of the continental early warning arrangement of the CEWS in the face of 
differences in terms of conflict early warning objectives; methods and tools; as well as 
institutional set-up and development shown in chapter five.  
 
In order to achieve this principal objective, the following tasks will be undertaken. First, the 
rationale for an epistemic or knowledge-based approach to harmonization of the early warning 
systems within the continental early warning framework of the CEWS will be explored relying 
primarily on the work of Ulf Engel and João Porto Gomes who participated in the various 
stages of operationalization the CEWS. Secondly, the main legal provisions that laid the 
foundation for harmonization of conflict early warning systems will be discussed. Thirdly, the 
areas and modalities of harmonization will be explored. Afterwards, the chapter concludes by 
examining the various challenges to the harmonization process. 
 
6.2. The Rationale for an Epistemic Approach to Harmonization  
As indicated earlier in this study, the CEWS, which also incorporates other early warning 
systems in the continent, is part of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) which 
is considered as a “security regime in-the-making.”279 According to Ulf Engel and João Porto 
Gomes, security regimes such as the APSA are not simply born out of legally formed 
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agreements and institutions only.280 In addition to legal norms, Engel and Gomes Porto have 
argued that the existence of security regimes also depends on “effectiveness and durability 
which come with the promotion of learning and transmission of knowledge.”281 In the 
particular case of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), they further argued that 
its future effectiveness as a peace and security regime relies on the modification of collective 
behavior and the creation of new collective understanding through cognition and learning as 
political processes.282  
 
According to these authors, one important approach of forming the collective behavior and 
understanding essential for the effectiveness and full-functionality of the Africa’s security 
regime is “through the gradual development of epistemic communities around the various 
pillars of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)”283 and they consider the 
operationalization of the CEWS as “a very promising point of entry”284 in this regard.285 
 
Conceived as “as networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain 
or issue area,”286 epistemic communities of the kind which Engel and Gomes Porto also 
suggested in the case of the CEWS, owe their existence to three underlying factors, namely; 
                                                                                                                                                    
279 Engel and Gomes Porto, “The African Union’s”, (without page numbers). 
280 Ibid. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Ibid. 
283 Ibid. 
284 Ibid. 
285 Members of an epistemic communities may come from different disciplines but they all share the following 
set of characteristics: (1) shared values or principled beliefs (these provide a value-based rationale for social 
action of the members of the community); (2) shared causal beliefs or professional judgment: these provide 
analytic reasons and explanations of behavior, offering causal explanations for multiple linkages between policy 
actions and desired outcomes; (3) common notions of validity: inter-subjective, internally defined criteria for 
validating knowledge; (4) common policy enterprise: set of practices associated with a central set of problems 
which have to be tackled. Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy 
Coordination”, International Organization 46, no. 1(1992): 3. 
286 Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities”, 3. 
 67 
 
 
“uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalization.”287 As shown by Peter M. Haas, who is 
one of proponents of the concept of epistemic communities, “the increasingly complex and 
technical nature of the ever-widening range of issues considered on the international agenda 
have forced decision-makers to turn to specialists to ameliorate uncertainties and help them 
understand the current issues and anticipate future trends.”288 
 
According to Haas, the turn to epistemic communities under conditions of uncertainty have 
various “incentives and reasons.”289 Firstly, the epistemic communities can elucidate the cause-
and-effect relationships and provide advice about the likely results of the various courses of 
action.290 Second epistemic communities can shed light on the nature of the complex inter-
linkages between issues and on the chain of events that might proceed either from failure to 
take action or from instituting particular policy.291 Additionally, they can also help in 
formulating polices.292 
 
In the same token, an epistemic approach to CEWS is also justified here based on the above 
mentioned “incentives and reasons” of an epistemic communities which may prove to be 
beneficial to overcome uncertainties which may arise when dealing with complex undertakings 
such as early warning. In the specific case of the harmonization process, the differences in 
terms of early warning practices shown in the previous chapter can be conceived as major 
sources of technical uncertainties surrounding the nature of cooperation and partnership 
among the various conflict early warning mechanisms in the continent. And these 
uncertainties can be addressed through the formation of epistemic communities which have 
                                                 
287 Ibid. 
288 Ibid.,13. 
289 Ibid.,15. 
290 Ibid.,13. 
291 Ibid.,16. 
292 Ibid. 
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the capacity to “shed light on the nature of the complex inter-linkages between issues and on 
the chain of events”293 as in the case of harmonization of conflict early warning systems in the 
context of the CEWS. In more specific terms, as hinted by Ulf Engel, these uncertainties can 
be tackled  by creating a largely technical and knowledge-based consensus among the different 
early warning systems on major (early warning) activities such as data collection, conflict and 
cooperation analysis, early report writing, data exchange, etc. 294  
 
6.3. Legal Provisions for Harmonization 
The legal provisions for harmonization of conflict early warning systems are to be found in 
key African Union official documents of the Peace and Security Protocol (PSC Protocol); the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the African Union and the various Regional 
Economic Communities (MOU); and in the CEWS Handbook.  
 
In the PSC Protocol, the issue of harmonization is addressed both explicitly and implicitly. 
Explicitly, the PSC highlights the need for “harmonization” within the larger framework of 
the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by stipulating “the Peace and Security 
Council and the Chairperson of the Commission, shall [harmonize] and coordinate the 
activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that 
these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union.”295 In regards to 
early warning, a harmonized approach is also noted in an implicit manner in Article 12(2) b of 
the PSC Protocol296 which stipulated for the creation of an institutional arrangement in which 
the observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms form an integral part of the 
                                                 
293 Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities”, 16. 
294 Ulf Engel, “Response to Questions about CEWS as Epistemic Communities,” e-mail message to Dawit 
Yohannes Wondemagegnehu, August 12, 2009. 
295 African Union, Peace and Security Protocol, Article 16(Emphasis added by the author). 
296 African Union, Peace and Security Protocol, Article 12. 
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CEWS.297 According to Ulf Engel and Joao Gomes Porto, such an arrangement symbolizes an 
important expression of “the harmonizing role of the African Union (CEWS).298  
 
The MOU299 also highlighted the need for an effective partnership and harmonized 
relationship between the regional early warning mechanisms and CEWS based on the 
“Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early Warning System”, another 
AU document instrumental in operationalizing the CEWS. The latter document has also noted 
that “synchronization, coordination, collaboration and [harmonization] between the AU and 
the RECs are essential for effective functioning of the CEWS.”300  
 
6.4. Modalities of Harmonization: How and What to Harmonize 
Although all the specific strategies and modalities for achieving the required level of 
harmonization and coordination among the early warning systems in Africa are yet to be 
worked out301, the key AU official documents mentioned earlier, namely the PSC Protocol, the 
MOU, the CEWS Handbook as well as other relevant documents have all attempted to 
address the issue (of strategies of harmonization) to varying degrees of analysis. Owing to  the 
technical nature of the specific issues of the modalities, the PSC Protocol and the MOU are 
less clear in the specifying what elements of the early warning systems are to be harmonized 
and how. In contrast, the Framework for the Operationalization of the Continental Early 
Warning System, the Draft Roadmap for the Operationalization of the CEWS, and the CEWS 
                                                 
297 Article 12(b) of the PSC Protocol states that the “observation and monitoring units of the Regional 
Mechanisms are to be linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the Situation Room, and 
which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room”. Ibid. 
298 Engel and Gomes Porto, “The African Union’s”, (without page numbers). 
299 African Union, Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African 
Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and 
Northern Africa (Addis Ababa: African Union, 2008), Article VI(3). 
300 AU-CMD, “Framework for the Operationalization”, 54. 
301 It is to be noted here that the process of harmonizing the early warning systems is still an ongoing process. 
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Handbook have better addressed some of the specific issues regarding the strategies for the 
creation of harmonized partnership between the sub-regional early warning mechanisms and 
CEWS. 
 
According to the later three documents, the proposed areas for harmonization among the 
various systems include information sharing and data exchange; early warning data collection; 
conflict and cooperation analysis; formulation of policy options and reporting.302 
Subsequently, in the following sections, the progress on each of the first three areas as well as 
their “proposed workable implementation strategies”303 will be discussed. Nevertheless, owing 
to the incomplete nature of the information on the last two, the discussion on harmonization 
of formulation of options and early warning reporting is left out in this study.  
 
6.4.1. Information Sharing and Data Exchange 
CEWS is envisaged as “an open-source system where data is gathered from a wide variety of 
sources including the AU itself and those generated by the other early warning mechanisms in 
the continent.”304 Accordingly creating an efficient information exchange mechanism between 
the CEWS and the other early warning systems was taken into consideration and a variety of 
strategies were suggested in the Draft Roadmap, Framework for the Operationalization of the 
CEWS and the CEWS Handbook to this end. Especially, as shown in the Framework for the 
operationalization of the CEWS, the suggested strategies for a system of regular exchange of 
information include: 
 the establishment of secure website; the convening of periodic meetings on early warning; 
exchange of experiences; joint training and capacity building actions; the systematic participation 
of RECs and other relevant regional mechanisms in discussions on issues brought before the PSC 
                                                 
302 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 9; AU-CMD, “Framework for the Operationalization”, 54. 
303 AU-CMD, “Draft Roadmap for the Operationalization”, 72. 
304 Ibid,. 67. 
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and of interest to them; the establishment of liaison offices.305 
 
 
Whereas all of the above proposed measures have not yet been fully implemented during the 
time of this study, according to Charles Mwaura, Africa Union’s expert on Conflict Early 
Warning System and Preventive Diplomacy, significant progress was made when it comes to 
harmonization of information exchange between the CEWS and the other early warning 
systems.306 The most notable developments in this regard include the establishment of the AU 
CEWS Portal307, the launch of the VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) connection308 and 
periodic technical meetings between the CEWS and the other RECs.309  
 
6.4.2. Early Warning Data Collection and Indicators 
Another major operational area where harmonization is being undertaken in the evolving 
African continental early warning framework is data collection which is based on the 
identification and monitoring of relevant conflict early warning indicators. Prior to discussing 
its strategies for harmonization, it is worthwhile here to briefly outline the process of data 
collection in the CEWS’ methodological framework which also depends on information 
obtained from other conflict early warning mechanisms such as the CEWARN and 
ECOWARN as shown earlier in Section 6.4.1 (See Figure 6.1 for CEWS Methodology). 
 
                                                 
305 AU-CMD, “Framework for the Operationalization”, 54 
306 Charles Mwaura, interview by author, Addis Ababa, June 3rd, 2009. 
307 The AU CEWS Portal is an electronic interface of the CEWS for interaction with the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) as well as other CEWS stakeholders such as the UN. African Union, “Briefing Note on the 
Implementation of the Continental Early Warning System”, Consultative Meeting between the AU and the 
International Organizations on the Operationalization of the CEWS, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 1-2 April, 2008, 4. 
308  VSAT is a satellite communication system which is intended to modernized communication between the AU 
Commission and outside stakeholders. It will allow data transmission services in real time; facilitate free 
telephone calls between the linked parties, and video conferencing which will in turn reduce travel-related costs. 
African Union Commission, “Launch of VSAT”, AUC News: The Newsletter of the African Commission, Issue 
19(2007): http://www.africa-union.org/root/UA/Newsletter/aucnews_june07.pdf, (accessed July 23, 2009). 
309 Charles Mwaura, interview by author, Addis Ababa, June 3rd, 2009. 
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According to the CEWS Handbook, information collection and monitoring in the CEWS is to 
be carried out through the “process of data-driven analysis based on the development of an 
early warning module with clearly defined and accepted political, social, military and 
humanitarian indicators.”310 Such form of data driven analysis begins with the specification of 
indicators and is followed by continuous monitoring for changes of the indicators over time.311  
 
The CEWS indicators module employed for the collection of data needed for monitoring 
violent conflicts consists of two types of indicators namely structural indicators and dynamic 
or behavioral/event indicators.312 Structural indicators are early warning indicators which the 
CEWS compile to reveal slowly changing, long term or structural factors313 underlying violent 
conflicts.314 Based on these indicators, the CEWS maintain a database of structural factors that 
may lead to the breakout or escalation of conflicts in all countries in the continent by 
developing Country315 and Actor Profile316 baselines. The Country and Actor Profile baselines 
compiled with the help of the structural indicators are subsequently used to conduct structural 
risk assessment essential in providing a reliable early warning report to decision-makers at 
various levels in the African Union.317  
 
On the other hand, dynamic indicators are a set of rapidly changing indicators of human 
                                                 
310 Ibid., 48. 
311 Ibid. 
312 African Union, “Briefing Note on the Implementation”, 4. 
313 Structural indicators are essential in revealing the root causes of conflicts and include factors such as 
inadequate governance, contested borders, ethnic politics, population growth, patterns of cultural discrimination, 
etc. AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 48. 
314 Ibid. 
315 Country Profile is a web-based relational database where structural country data will be stored and regularly 
updated by the Situation Room. In addition to basic facts such as geography and population, the Country Profile 
includes a “Basket” of indicators on a wide range of issues such as political, economic, social, environmental,   
humanitarian, and military aspects. Ibid., 50. 
316 Actor Profile is the result of the analysis that aims to identify the main protagonists who influence or are 
affected by a situation (at a country, regional or international level). Like the country profile baselines, shifts in 
the actor profile baselines can reveal situations of potential conflict. Ibid., 52. 
317 Ibid., 50-51. 
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action and behaviors.318 They also embody the “basic event parameters of who did what 
to/with whom, when, where, why and how.”319 The development of behavior and event 
indicator baselines is also undertaken through data driven analysis by the continuous 
monitoring of a set of indicators320 and tracking for inflections over time which indicate a 
possible escalation.321  
 
The structural and event (behavioral) data which feed into the CEWS’ data collection 
framework are obtained from a variety of sources. Whereas sources for the data-sets of the 
indicators may include the AU Field Missions, NGOs, AU Member States, International 
Organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations322, the bulk of the information 
is to be received from other early warning mechanisms in Africa such as the CEWARN and 
ECOWARN which have already developed their own structural and event data tracking 
mechanisms.323   
 
According to the CEWS Handbook, the details of harmonizing data collection based on the 
structural and event (behavioral) indicators have yet to be resolved in terms of specific 
instruments such as software applications, data formats, templates etc.324 Nevertheless, the 
Handbook generally indicated that the process of harmonization in this regard would be take 
the form of close partnership among the various early warning mechanisms based on 
“division of labor.”325 Such form of partnership is expected to translate into the creation of a 
mechanism in which the sub-regional early warning mechanisms continue to collect data both 
                                                 
318 AU-CMD, “Proposal for the Indicators Module”, 90. 
319 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 49. 
320 Examples of dynamic indicators include hate speech, arms or resource acquisitions, new discriminatory and 
repressive policies, etc. Ibid., 62. 
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Ibid., 55. 
325 Ibid., 56. 
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on structural and event indicators and transmit the same to the CEWS.326 Additionally, the 
sub-regional early warning systems are also expected to contribute to the enrichment of the 
CEWS indicators module to be used for the whole continent by adding their respective unique 
regional perspective and by sharing “their list of indicators with the African Union.”327 In 
addition to utilization of the AU CEWS Portal mentioned earlier328, conducting periodic 
consultations329 and using the “Bulletin Board”330 for joint use by the CEWS and the other 
early warning systems are some of the measures being undertaken to enhance coordination 
and harmonization on data collection.331  
 
6.4.3. Conflict and Cooperation Analysis 
It is already shown332 that the CEWS, as a continental early warning framework, aspires to 
operate “in an integrated fashion, with a shared purpose, methodological compatibility and 
terminology”333 taking into consideration the constituent role assigned to other early warning 
mechanisms in the continent.334 Accordingly, another major area where the above form of 
methodological and terminological compatibility is to be realized is conflict and cooperation 
analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
326 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 56. 
327 African Union, African Union, “AU and EAC Host Technical Meeting on Progress of Continental Early 
Warning System”, Quarterly Bulletin: Peace and Security 1, no. 3(2009). Available on:  http://www.africa-
union.org/root/UA/Newsletter/PSC/Q%20B-vol%201%20%20No%203.pdf , (accessed on August 29, 2009). 
328 See Section 6.7.1 on Information Sharing and Data Exchange. 
329 The periodic joint consultations are undertaken by representatives from the CEWS and the other early 
warning systems such as ECOWARN, CEWARN and SADC. 
330 The “Bulletin Board” is computer software that allows for the posting of field news narrative reports essential 
for even tracking which will be translated into their full context. AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 55. 
331 AU-CMD, CEWS Handbook, 55. 
332 Refer Section 5.7 of this study. 
333 AU-CMD, CEWS Handbook, 9. 
334 Ibid. 
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Figure 6.1. CEWS Methodology335 
 
 
 As shown in the CEWS Handbook, conflict analysis in the CEWS is to be conducted based 
on the development of baseline data and information compiled from the data collection stage 
utilizing both structural and event(behavioral) indicators discussed earlier.336 The main purpose 
of conflict and cooperation analysis is to get a deeper understanding of the causes of conflicts 
through the systematic monitoring of risk indicators, including the analysis of trends and 
dynamics and their significance in their specific, structural contexts.337 There are different 
forms of analysis subsumed within the rubric of conflict and cooperation analysis namely; 
structural or root causes analysis, actor analysis, and dynamic analysis (See Figure 6.1 of 
CEWS methodology for the process of conflict and cooperation analysis).338  
                                                 
335 AU-CMD, The CEWS Handbook, 10. 
336 Ibid., 57. 
337 African Union, “Briefing Note”, 6. 
338 AU-CMD, CEWS Handbook, 57. 
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During the first stage of the analysis, the analyst attempts to identify structural or root causes 
as key sources of tension that have led or are likely to lead to conflict based on the structural 
indicator339 data-sets discussed earlier.340 As indicated in the CEWS Handbook, structural or 
root causes are to be found in political, economic, security, social, religious structures at local, 
regional, national and international levels.341 Actor analysis is conducted simultaneously with 
structural analysis to identify the main protagonists (groups, institutions, individuals) who 
influence (positively or negatively) the situation under analysis.342 Following the above two 
forms of analysis, dynamic analysis is undertaken to identify possible aggravating, inhibiting 
and triggering events.343 The results of the above three forms of analysis are employed at a 
later stage for the development of possible scenarios and the formulation of policy and 
response options.344 
 
Similar to the case of the data collection process discussed earlier in Section 6.4.2, the CEWS’ 
conflict and cooperation analysis methodology significantly relies upon the its cooperation 
with other early warning mechanisms in the continent since it builds upon the “country and 
actor profiles and the resulting baselines”345 obtained from existing early warning systems such 
as CEWARN and ECOWARN which have already developed the capability to maintain their 
own datasets both on structural and event (behavioral) indicators.346 As a result, cooperation 
between the other early warning systems and the CEWS in regards to conflict and cooperation 
analysis has become an important requirement for the full-functionality of the continental 
                                                 
339 Refer to Section 6.4.2 of this study. 
340 AU-CMD, CEWS Handbook, 57. 
341 Ibid., 58. 
342 Ibid., 60. 
343 Ibid., 61. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid., 57. 
346 Ibid., 49. 
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early warning framework.  
 
Even though the details of harmonization and coordination in regards to specific issues of 
conflict and cooperation analysis have yet to be jointly resolved,347 some measures were 
undertaken to the same end during the time of this study. Most notable in this regard was the 
“joint exercise of analyzing conflicts by using the Conflict Strategic Analysis system of the 
CEWS”348 involving representatives from the CEWS and the sub-regional mechanisms with 
the purpose of acquainting conflict analysts with the CEWS’ conflict analysis methodology 
which is expected to be replicated in all the early warning systems in Africa. 
 
6.5 Challenges and Constraints of Harmonization  
The discussion in the previous parts sought to highlight areas and modalities of harmonization 
between the regional early warning systems and the CEWS by focusing on specific early 
warning functions in which some level of progress was made to the same end. The discussion 
also showed that while harmonization progressed in some areas of early warning functions, it 
did not start in others largely due to the novelty of the operationalization of the CEWS which 
is still considered as “work-in-progress”349. Besides the identification of areas and modalities of 
harmonization as attempted thus far in this chapter, this study has also sought to identify the 
different challenges to the harmonizing efforts of the CEWS and these will be discussed as 
follows. 
 
The first challenge to the creation of a methodologically compatible continental early warning 
                                                 
347 Ibid., 63. 
348 CEWARN, “African Union Commission, Regional Economic Communities discuss progress on Continental 
Early Warning System Initiative”, CEWARN Monthly, No. 17(2009). Available on: 
http://www.cewarn.org/bulletin/09/April.pdf, (accessed on August 20, 2009). 
349 Charles Mwaura, interview by author. 
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framework is the different level of development of the various early warning systems.350 While 
some of the systems such as CEWARN and ECOWARN are more advanced and have 
partially or fully implemented most of the functional components of their early warning 
mechanisms, others are still in the preliminary stage of operationalizing their respective early 
warning systems.351 According to Kwaku Asante-Darko, Senior Expert on Conflict Prevention 
in the AU, coupled with capacity problems which is inherent in almost all the mechanisms, 
such variance in terms of the institutional maturity of the systems is considered as an obstacle 
to the harmonizing role of the CEWS since it distorts the uniformity of the efforts geared 
towards the creation of an early warning methodology for the whole continent.352  
 
Secondly, the absence of a suitable blueprint to emulate was raised as another challenge to the 
process of harmonization.353 Operationalizing the CEWS is unique in the sense that no other 
attempt was made in other parts of the world to integrate several early warning systems into 
one continental framework. According to Charles Mwaura, as a result of such unique and “sui 
generis” nature of operationalizing the CEWS, those who are propelling the process do not 
have the option of importing best practices from similar endeavors elsewhere in the world. 354  
 
The third challenge is related to the participation of civil society in conflict early warning in 
the various systems and this challenge manifests in two forms.355 Firstly, the level of civil 
society participation that feeds into the early warning systems varies in the different early 
warning mechanisms. Whereas it is advanced in some regions356such as Western Africa357, it is 
                                                 
350 Kwaku Asante-Darko, interview by author, Addis Ababa, June 1st, 2009. 
351 In some of the RECs, the early warning systems are still non-existent and one informant succinctly expressed 
the difficulty of harmonization in such cases by claiming “one can not talk of harmonizing when there is nothing 
to harmonize.” Raymond Kitevu, interview by author, Addis Ababa, June 1, 2009. 
352 Ibid. 
353 Charles Mwaura, interview by author. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Kwaku Asante-Darko, interview by author. 
356 The level of civil society participation is often linked to the nature of the political systems in the respective 
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still in its premature stage in others such as the Northern Africa. Consequently, the variance in 
civil society participation in turn impacts the level of development of the respective early 
warning systems since civil society organizations are, by and large, expected358 to have a very 
crucial role in conflict early warning through their participation in different activities such as 
early warning data collection, analytical and conceptual research activities and coordinating 
response at various levels.359 Secondly, in those cases where there is active civil society 
participation in early warning, most of the early warning reports received from the civil society 
organizations were not consistent and “systematic” in the sense that they do not fully conform 
to the reporting formats employed by the CEWS and the other early warning systems.360  
 
The fourth challenge is associated with the role of donors which play a crucial role in the 
implementation and operationalization of most of the conflict early warning systems in 
Africa.361 Currently most of the early warning systems rely on funds obtained from donors 
who cover most of their financial expenses including their overhead costs. Consequently, the 
systems are increasing compelled to give precedence to donor priorities or demands over their 
own operational priorities in various early warning activities. In addition, largely due to their 
capacity problem which was hinted earlier, most of the early warning systems are also having 
difficulties in utilizing the available financial resources from the donors. As a result, the 
combined effect of trying to honor donor demands and failure to appropriately utilize funds is 
slowing the progress of implementation of early warning mechanisms in the various sub-
regions and this in turn is impacting the process of harmonization and coordination. 
                                                                                                                                                    
regions. Ideally fledgling civil society is expected in a democratic and participatory political environment. 
357 The most notable example indicating the enhanced role of civil society participation in West Africa is 
WANEP’s role in the implementation of West Africa’s early warning mechanism of ECOWARN. 
358 For the role of civil society in conflict early warning and prevention, refer: AU [African Union] CMD 
[Conflict Management Division] (Eds.), “Civil Society Participation in Conflict Prevention in Africa: An Agenda 
for Action.”, In Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention in Africa: Towards the Operationalization of the Continental 
Early Warning System (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2008a), 95-96. 
359 Kwaku Asante-Darko, interview by author.  
360 Charles Mwaura, interview by author. 
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Finally, the “lack of political will and sensitivities about state sovereignty”362 are considered as 
additional challenges which are conceived to have negative impacts on the institutionalization 
of a harmonized and coordinated continental early warning framework.363 Given the fact that 
the various systems that constitute the CEWS are intergovernmental in nature, the 
contribution of national governments is essential for the success of the continental early 
warning arrangement. Nonetheless, most member states have not yet fully committed 
themselves to the effective functioning of the conflict early warning systems that may have the 
potential to “unearth things that states would rather keep hidden.”364 Additionally, member 
states are also found to be reluctant to use “official intelligence in an otherwise transparent 
forum”365 adhering to the “the sanctity of the principle of sovereign equality.”366 While such 
absence of political will and commitment to early warning are challenges which also apply to 
the effectiveness of conflict early warning in general,367 they are also conceived as having their 
own implications on the harmonizing and coordinating role of the CEWS.368  
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362 Ibid., 44. 
363 Raymond Kitevu, interview by author. 
364 Aning, “The African Union’s Peace”, 13. 
365 Fanta, “The Capacity of African”, 7. 
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368 Raymond Kitevu, interview by author. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
 
As indicated earlier at the introduction of this thesis, the main objective of this study is to 
explore the ongoing process of harmonizing the different conflict early warning mechanisms 
in Africa which is envisaged to be undertaken within the overarching framework of the 
CEWS. In order to achieve this objective, the study raised three related research questions 
which in combination were meant to help in identifying the areas, modalities, and challenges 
of harmonization. Before dealing with these questions, the study explored conceptual issues 
related with the theory and practice of conflict early warning; summarized historical root 
causes of conflicts in Africa; and provided an overview of the history of early warning in 
Africa.  
 
In addressing the first research question that sought to explore the different approaches to the 
practice of conflict early warning, the study presented a comparative analysis of the CEWARN 
and ECOWARN and featured both differences and similarities observed in terms of early 
warning objectives, methodology, institutional arrangement and level of development, and 
linkage with response strategies. When dealing with the remaining research questions which 
were intended to examine the areas, measures, strategies, and challenges of harmonization, the 
study first explored the CEWS’ epistemic or knowledge-based approach of forming consensus 
in terms of early warning practice by identifying the areas of harmonization which included: 
information sharing and data exchange, data collection, conflict and cooperation analysis, early 
warning report writing, and formulation of policy options. Subsequently based on the analysis 
of the existing official documents and expert interviews which were accessible during the 
research process, the various modalities of harmonization employed by the CEWS were 
examined. In this regard, the study revealed that while relative progress was made in terms of 
harmonization in some areas such as information sharing and data exchange, a lot remains to 
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be done in streamlining the details of cooperation and coordination in other areas such as 
formulation of policy options and conflict and cooperation analysis.  
 
As a form assessing the overall progress of the research so far, it can be asserted that the study 
has provided the basic empirics needed to conceptualize harmonization of conflict early 
warning as an ongoing and “little understood” process by showing its legal foundations, 
strategies, current progress as well as its challenges. Admittedly, all aspects raised in the 
research questions were not adequately covered due to limitations largely related to getting the 
relevant official and up-to-date information regarding the ongoing process of harmonization. 
Given proper access to relevant data, there is a potential for future studies to contribute to the 
successful operationalization of a harmonized continental early warning mechanism especially 
through the identification of further strategies and modalities of interfacing conflict early 
warning in the continent. 
 
Finally, based on the overall findings and observations thus far, as an exploratory study, this 
thesis concludes by proposing the following hypotheses which can be further tested by similar 
enquiries in the future. Firstly, even though no established official definition of 
“harmonization of conflict early warning systems” was found during the study, from the way 
it is currently practiced, its conception tilts more in the direction of the comprehensive 
conception of the term369 which asserts that harmonization does not create uniformity but 
results only in the elimination of methodological incompatibilities. This is practically 
evidenced by the fact that harmonization in most of areas builds up on the activities of the 
existing early warning mechanisms and seeks to create compatible strategies based on 
principles such as division of labour and preservation of the regional nature of the respective 
                                                 
369 As indicated at the beginning of this study in Section 1.4. 
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systems. Consequently, emphasising the need for appropriate defintion of the process, this 
study echoes similar assertions made in other areas of harmonization370 by recommending that 
the African Union should “establish an agreed, concise conceptualization of what 
harmonization is so that the term conjures up similar connotations and implications to all 
stakeholders.”371  
 
Secondly, while most of the measures which are being undertaken to achieve harmonization 
are largely technical and perhaps procedural in their essence, harmonization as a process is 
delinked from the political and complex issues surrounding the coordination and cooperation 
of the early warning systems.372 As shown in the study, the current approach to harmonization 
by the African Union (CEWS) builds upon the experience of existing mechanisms, some of 
which have a narrow and largely “apolitical” approach of monitoring conflicts.373 In most of 
the cases, member states of the systems have not yet fully agreed to share early warning 
information obtained from their legislative domain. Additionally, they are also reluctant to 
sacrifice their sovereignty by allowing an inter-governmental body to collect information on 
the potential outbreak of violent conflicts within their jurisdiction especially in situations when 
governments themselves play a part in the conflicts. In this regard, in addition to its current 
drive in forming knowledge-based consensus around the CEWS as already shown in this 
study, the African Union can play a role in garnering the political will and commitment of its 
member states to the effective operation of the conflict early warning both at the sub-regional 
and continental levels. 
 
                                                 
370 For instance in the case of harmonization of Higher Education in Africa. 
371 African Union, “Harmonization of Higher Education”, 11. 
372 The importance of forming knowledge-based, technical and epistemic consensus is not questioned here. 
Nevertheless, the argument here is that by binding political decisions in major policy areas related to conflict early 
warning should also be considered in the process of harmonizing conflict early warning. 
373 Most notable in this regard is CEWARN’s focus on pastoral conflicts only which is considered as a way of 
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Thirdly, whereas it is an essential element of prevention of conflicts, the issue of response has 
not been adequately featured in the ongoing process of harmonizing the different early 
warning systems. Consequently, in conjunction with the efforts to create a compatible early 
warning methodology for the entire continent, the AU should also ensure that adequate 
response strategies are also integrated along with the capacity to collect and analyze conflict 
related data and information in the various early warning mechanisms in the continent. 
 
Lastly, the process of harmonization has not yet fully engaged the participation of civil society 
organizations which can play a crucial role in conflict early warning in Africa. In this regard,  
harmonization still needs to address building the capacity of NGOs involved in early warning 
through various means such as conducting training geared towards increasing the quality and 
consistency of their reports and improving their  of data collection techniques.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
avoiding political sensitivities within the member states. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Interview Guide 
 
 
 
1. How do you conceive harmonization? 
2. What are the major differences that exist between the various conflict early warning 
systems or mechanisms in the continent?  
3. And what is the impact of these differences on the process of harmonization and 
coordination of the early warning systems within the CEWS framework?  
4. How do you assess the possibility harmonizing conflict early warning in the face of 
differences in terms of methodology, purpose and institutional arrangements?  
5. What aspects of the early warning systems are expected to be harmonized? Is it 
harmonization of early warning purpose, methodology or terminology? 
6. What is the role of CEWS/AU in harmonizing the various early warning systems? 
7. What are the main challenges to the process of harmonization? 
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Appendix B: Description of CEWARN’s Indicators: Situation Reports374 
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Appendix C: Description of CEWARN Indicators: Violent Incident Reports375 
 
Armed Clashes 
• Military Battle (Armed hostilities or engagements between an official military unit of a 
government and an armed party. Includes both civil war and inter-state war battles. 
• Other Armed Clashes (All other armed hostilities or engagements. Includes all communal 
and inter-communal battles. 
 
Raids 
• Raids with Abductions (Raids focused around abductions of people or the taking of 
hostages. May include injuries or death to humans, and/or damage, destruction or 
theft of other property). 
• Organized Raids (Other organized raids. May include injuries or deaths to humans, 
and/or damage, destruction or theft of other property). 
• Livestock Theft (Raids focused around the theft of livestock. May include injuries or 
death to humans, and/or damage, destruction or theft of other property. 
 
Protest Demonstrations 
• Peaceful Protests (peaceful protest demonstrations or assemblies. May include isolated or 
low-level violence). 
• Violent Turmoil or Riots (Assemblies or crowds that get out of control. Marked by 
violence, disorder, damage and/or destruction). 
 
Other Crimes 
• Assaults (Physical attacks and abuse involving the actual use of physical force against 
individuals, and/or groups. Does not include abductions). 
• Banditry (Commandeering of vehicles, highway robbery, and other similar criminal 
activities). 
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